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BESPOKE BANKRUPTCY
Laura N. Coordes*
Abstract
The U.S. Bankruptcy Code is the primary source of bankruptcy relief
for debtors in the United States. But it is not the only source. Over the
years, Congress has occasionally created bespoke bankruptcy—
customized debt relief designed for a particular group of debtors.
Bespoke bankruptcy may provide desperately needed bankruptcy relief
to entities that are ineligible or otherwise unable to access bankruptcy
through the Bankruptcy Code. But bespoke bankruptcy is also fraught
with difficulties. To what extent should bespoke bankruptcy be used or
developed instead of the Bankruptcy Code?
This Article takes up this question. It begins by acknowledging the
limitations of the Bankruptcy Code and highlighting instances where
Code-based bankruptcy relief does not work. It then introduces the
concept of bespoke bankruptcy and devises a framework that
policymakers can use to decide when and how to implement it. In so
doing, this Article sets the stage for a new direction in bankruptcy law:
one where bespoke bankruptcy performs a limited, but critical, role in
providing relief to entities that the Bankruptcy Code either does not or
cannot assist.
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INTRODUCTION
In the spring of 2016, Puerto Rico found itself on a financial precipice.
Years of overborrowing and other poor economic decisions,1 spurred in
part by mainland U.S. policies,2 had saddled the island with “layers of
debt.”3 In April of 2016, then-Governor Alejandro García Padilla signed
an emergency moratorium just before the island defaulted on a $422
million bond payment, while warning that Puerto Rico would also default
on an upcoming July 1 bond payment of $800 million.4 These defaults
threatened to “trigger a cycle of hospital closures, electric-grid instability,
infrastructur[e] collapse, and emergency-service breakdowns.”5 In other
words, Puerto Rico’s financial distress was at risk of morphing into a
humanitarian disaster.
Unfortunately, Puerto Rico had no way to address its mounting
problems. The government lacked the money to repay the bonds.6 Rating
agencies downgraded the island’s credit ratings to junk, impeding its
ability to borrow additional funds.7 In June of 2016, the U.S. Supreme

1. See Jim Wyss & Michelle Kaske, Puerto Rico’s Comeback Was Nigh, but Then the
Coronavirus Came, BLOOMBERG L. (June 12, 2020, 7:30 AM), https://news.bloomberglaw.com/
bankruptcy-law/puerto-ricos-comeback-was-nigh-but-then-the-coronavirus-came (“For years the
commonwealth sold debt to paper over budget gaps.”).
2. See Fin. Oversight & Mgmt. Bd. for P.R. v. Aurelius Inv., LLC, 140 S. Ct. 1649, 1673
(2020) (Sotomayor, J., concurring) (“Congress repealed Puerto Rico’s favorable tax credits, and
manufacturing growth deflated, precipitating a prolonged recession.”).
3. John A. E. Pottow, What Bankruptcy Law Can and Cannot Do for Puerto Rico, 85
REVISTA JURIDICA UNIVERSIDAD DE P.R. 689, 701 (2016).
4. Ed Morales, Who is Responsible for Puerto Rico’s Debt?, NATION (June 7, 2016),
https://www.thenation.com/article/who-is-responsible-for-puerto-ricos-debt/.
5. Id.
6. See id.
7. Fin. Oversight & Mgmt. Bd. for P.R., 140 S. Ct. at 1673 (Sotomayor, J., concurring).
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Court confirmed that neither Puerto Rico nor its municipalities8 were
eligible for bankruptcy relief under the U.S. Bankruptcy Code, while
striking down Puerto Rico’s attempt to create its own bankruptcy law.9
Even if Puerto Rico had been eligible to file for bankruptcy, the
Bankruptcy Code does not have a procedure designed to restructure or
adjust the debts of a U.S. territory, meaning that, at best, Puerto Rico
would have only had access to partial relief.10
On June 30, 2016, the day before Puerto Rico was set to default on the
$800 million bond payment, Congress stepped in, passing the Puerto Rico
Oversight, Management, and Economic Stability Act (PROMESA).11
PROMESA provided a form of bankruptcy relief designed specifically
for Puerto Rico and its instrumentalities.12 When President Barack
Obama signed the Act into law, he claimed it would provide “more
stability, better services and greater prosperity over the long term for the
people of Puerto Rico.”13 Though even its supporters acknowledged that
the law was far from perfect, there was a clear sense of hope that this new
law—a combination of traditional bankruptcy relief and other debt
restructuring mechanisms—would provide Puerto Rico with a fresh start
and a functioning economy.14
PROMESA is a prominent example of what this Article calls
“bespoke bankruptcy”—customized debt relief designed for a particular
group of debtors (in this case, Puerto Rico and its municipalities).
PROMESA combines portions of the Bankruptcy Code with other debt
restructuring tools, namely a financial oversight board and collective
8. This Article also refers to Puerto Rico’s municipalities as “instrumentalities,” which
tracks the language used in PROMESA. 48 U.S.C. § 2104(19)(A). For a discussion of the case
law addressing what constitutes a municipality eligible for relief under Chapter 9 of the
Bankruptcy Code, see Matthew Adam Bruckner, Special Purpose Municipal Entities and
Bankruptcy: The Case of Public Colleges, 36 EMORY BANKR. DEV. J. 341, 353–68 (2020).
9. See Puerto Rico v. Franklin Cal. Tax-Free Tr., 136 S. Ct. 1938, 1942, 1947 (2016).
10. See Pottow, supra note 3, at 700 (noting that Puerto Rico’s substantial, unsustainable
territorial debt would have been exempt under Chapter 9 of the Bankruptcy Code).
11. Pub. L. No. 114-187, 130 Stat. 549 (2016) (codified at 48 U.S.C. §§ 2101–2241).
12. See Patricia Guadalupe, Here’s How PROMESA Aims to Tackle Puerto Rico’s Debt,
NBC NEWS (June 30, 2016, 1:39 PM), https://www.nbcnews.com/news/latino/here-s-howpromesa-aims-tackle-puerto-rico-s-debt-n601741 [https://perma.cc/HW4T-3CZB]. Although
PROMESA was designed in response to Puerto Rico’s difficulties, by its terms it applies to other
territories as well. See 48 U.S.C. § 2104(20)(A)–(E).
13. Guadalupe, supra note 12.
14. See Ben Norton, Critics Say Bipartisan Bill Signed by Obama Imposes “Colonial”
Control Board on Puerto Rico, Puts “Hedge Funds Ahead of People,” SALON (July 1, 2016, 11:45
PM), https://www.salon.com/2016/07/01/critics_say_bipartisan_bill_signed_by_obama_imposes
_colonial_control_board_on_puerto_rico_puts_hedge_funds_ahead_of_people/ [https://perma.
cc/Z3MQ-2K6N] (“Some Democrats have admitted that they think the bill is bad, but argued it
must be passed as it is the only way for Puerto Rico to be able to restructure its debts and avoid
expensive legal fees when creditors take it to court.”).
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action provisions for bond modification.15 Although PROMESA
effectively provides a traditional bankruptcy procedure for the territory
and its instrumentalities through Title III of the Act, it also equips these
entities with tools and techniques drawn from sovereign debt
restructuring and out-of-court municipal finance practices to create a
form of relief that Congress hoped would be better suited to Puerto Rico’s
needs than anything in the Bankruptcy Code itself.16
Although the term “bespoke bankruptcy” is new, Congress has
designed bespoke relief before. Prior to PROMESA, Congress passed the
Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act (DoddFrank),17 which combines financial regulation with a federal, orderly
liquidation mechanism for certain financial firms.18 Today, in light of the
economic fallout from the COVID-19 pandemic, lawmakers and scholars
are questioning whether additional reforms are needed to make
bankruptcy a better tool for the entities it is designed to serve.19
As PROMESA illustrates, bespoke bankruptcy creates both new
challenges and new opportunities. Because PROMESA is new and
different from the Bankruptcy Code, its implementation has faced
setbacks that are rarely, if ever, seen in Code-based bankruptcy practice.20
Puerto Rico’s economic future is still uncertain today, four years after
PROMESA’s passage, and this uncertainty predated the recent economic
fallout due to the COVID-19 pandemic.21 Creditors, bondholders, the
15. Section II.A.2.b of this Article offers a fuller discussion of PROMESA.
16. See infra notes 180–182 and accompanying text.
17. Pub. L. No. 111-203, 124 Stat. 1376 (2010) (codified as amended in scattered sections
of 7, 12, 15, 18, 22, 31, 42 U.S.C.).
18. See David A. Skeel, Jr., When Should Bankruptcy Be an Option (for People, Places, or
Things)?, 55 WM. & MARY L. REV. 2217, 2225 (2014) (“With the new Dodd-Frank framework
and other administrative resolution rules, we are clearly in the realm of bankruptcy.”).
19. See, e.g., Jonathan S. Henes, Viewpoint: Congress Should Codify the One-Day
Bankruptcy, WALL ST. J. (May 11, 2020, 12:37 PM), https://www.wsj.com/articles/viewpointcongress-should-codify-the-one-day-bankruptcy-11589191200?shareToken=stb6c89d2d839142
7c91621fc250b12470 [https://perma.cc/MGL8-MP3F] (proposing that Congress codify a process
that would allow companies to use the Bankruptcy Code to confirm a one-day bankruptcy plan,
particularly in light of the burdens the economic fallout from COVID-19 is expected to place on
the bankruptcy courts); Gert-Jan Boon, Amending Insolvency Legislation in Response to the
COVID-19 Crisis, HARV. L. SCH. BANKR. ROUNDTABLE (May 12, 2020), https://blogs.harvard
.edu/bankruptcyroundtable/2020/05/12/amending-insolvency-legislation-in-response-to-thecovid-19-crisis/ [https://perma.cc/89TV-PUP9] (“Insolvency legislation which is effective under
normal market conditions may prove insufficient or ineffective in the current situation.”).
20. For example, the litigation surrounding the constitutionality of the oversight board’s
appointment, discussed in Section III.A, raises issues about the legitimacy of the board’s actions
that are not present in typical bankruptcy cases, which do not involve the imposition of an
oversight board.
21. See Danica Coto, Puerto Rico’s Economy in Limbo as Governor Rejects Debt Deal,
ASSOCIATED PRESS (Feb. 10, 2020), https://apnews.com/dd85b43cad66dec9026c4dd07df9287f
[https://perma.cc/28FV-UX74].
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local government, and the Puerto Rican people have all challenged the
oversight board and the scope of its authority to oversee the island’s
finances.22 The Puerto Rican government has wavered in its cooperation
with the board, at times supporting its debt restructuring efforts,23 and at
times appearing to undermine them.24 And the district judge overseeing
the court proceedings associated with the debt restructuring process has
had to interpret and apply a law that is new and unprecedented in many
respects.25
Yet, Puerto Rico’s experience also shows that sometimes the
Bankruptcy Code is not an appropriate mechanism to provide bankruptcy
relief. Indeed, the alternative to PROMESA, amending the Bankruptcy
Code to make Puerto Rico eligible for traditional bankruptcy, would have
been both politically and substantively difficult.26 Puerto Rico is thus an
example of a bankruptcy misfit: it needed bankruptcy, but the relief the
Bankruptcy Code provided was not appropriate for it.27 Through
PROMESA, Congress sought to achieve the same outcome for Puerto
Rico as sought by debtors that use the Bankruptcy Code—a fresh start—
but did so through very different means.
Puerto Rico is not alone in being a bankruptcy misfit. Other entities
are either ineligible for relief under the Bankruptcy Code28 or struggle to
22. These challenges have continued to the present day. See Dánica Coto, Board Submits
Puerto Rico Budget as Some Question Its Powers, WASH. TIMES (June 11, 2020),
https://www.washingtontimes.com/news/2020/jun/11/board-submits-puerto-rico-budget-assome-question-/ [perma.cc/7HK6-MUDS] (discussing congressional debates over the extent of
the oversight board’s authority).
23. See Robert Slavin, Puerto Rico Governor Makes FAFAA Head Her Liaison to Oversight
Board, BOND BUYER (Mar. 10, 2020, 11:44 AM), https://www.bondbuyer.com/news/puerto-ricogovernor-makes-fafaa-head-her-liaison-to-the-oversight-board [https://perma.cc/BC7R-ZW77]
(describing the governor’s wish that the government’s relationship with the oversight board be
“one of respect and openness”).
24. See Giovanna Garofalo, Puerto Rico Gov’t and Oversight Board Debate Over Approval
on Debt Deals, WKLY. J. (Feb. 12, 2020), https://www.theweeklyjournal.com/politics/puerto-ricogov-t-and-oversight-board-debate-over-approval-on-debt-deals/article_ff112d76-4d12-11ea-b1a
7-d7c71544db03.html [https://perma.cc/N6N8-MULA] (describing the governor’s rejection of
the board’s agreement with bondholders to reduce Puerto Rico’s debt by 70%).
25. See Jenna Greene, Proskauer Pair Win Watershed Decision in $125B Puerto Rico
Bankruptcy, AM. LAW. LITIG. DAILY (Jan. 10, 2020), https://s3.amazonaws.com/assets.
production.proskauer/uploads/961bf19743cfc6debca1b99583eea3cb.pdf [https://perma.cc/B6W
3-77S6] (“These are unprecedented cases . . . .”).
26. See Melika Hadžiomerović, Note, An Arbitral Solution: A Private Law Alternative to
Bankruptcy for Puerto Rico, Territories, and Sovereign Nations, 85 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1263,
1277 (2017) (arguing that PROMESA was “one of the only plausible courses of action available
at the time because the political climate did not allow for a Code amendment”).
27. Cf. Laura N. Coordes, Reorganizing Healthcare Bankruptcy, 61 B.C. L. REV. 419, 432–
33 (2020) (discussing the concept of bankruptcy misfits in the healthcare context).
28. See, e.g., 11 U.S.C. § 109(b), (d) (excluding most banks from using the Bankruptcy
Code).
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use the Bankruptcy Code even if they are eligible.29 In years to come,
Congress may well find it desirable to implement bespoke bankruptcy for
other debtor groups. The Bankruptcy Code is now over forty years old,30
and the world today is markedly different from the one in which the Code
was drafted. Scholars, policymakers, and practitioners have all expressed
concerns that the Bankruptcy Code no longer works as intended in many
ways, even for many of the debtors it was designed to serve in the first
place.31 But to what extent should bankruptcy law become more bespoke?
This Article maintains that bespoke bankruptcy should be used
sparingly but argues that it does have potential beyond its limited uses to
date. To make this case, Part I begins by defining and exploring the
limitations of “Code-based bankruptcy”: bankruptcy law that comes from
the Bankruptcy Code itself. The Bankruptcy Code is designed to be broad
in scope, accommodating a wide variety of entities. To accomplish this
goal efficiently, the Bankruptcy Code provides standard templates that
most entities can use to attain financial relief. These templates are based
on processes that work for the debtors that use the Bankruptcy Code most
often: businesses and consumers.
These standard templates may work well in many cases. However, as
Part II illustrates, some debtors are so differently situated from the
debtors the Code was designed to accommodate that Code-based
bankruptcy fails to provide them with adequate debt relief. Part II
catalogues the various ways that Congress has adjusted bankruptcy law
for these debtors, including through the creation of bespoke bankruptcy.
This Article then turns to the future of bankruptcy law, explaining that,
while most major debates about bankruptcy’s future focus on further
amendments to the Bankruptcy Code, bespoke bankruptcy is an option
worthy of consideration.
Part III then explores bespoke bankruptcy’s possible contributions to
bankruptcy law. The costs of bespoke bankruptcy are high in terms of
29. See, e.g., Coordes, supra note 27, at 432–33 (discussing healthcare businesses).
30. See Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-598, 92 Stat. 2549 (codified as
amended at 11 U.S.C.) (enacting Title 11 of the United States Code as the “Bankruptcy Code”).
31. See, e.g., William W. Bratton & David A. Skeel, Jr., Foreword, Bankruptcy’s New and
Old Frontiers, 166 U. PA. L. REV. 1571, 1572 (2018) (“Today’s typical Chapter 11 case looks
radically different than did the typical case in the Code’s early years.”); Charles J. Tabb, What’s
Wrong with Chapter 11?, at 9 (Univ. of Ill. Coll. of L. Legal Studies Research Paper, Paper No.
19-15, 2019), https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3352137 [https://perma.cc/
FPD4-6FWE] (critiquing modern Chapter 11 practice); COMM’N TO STUDY THE REFORM OF
CHAPTER 11, AM. BANKR. INST., FINAL REPORT AND RECOMMENDATIONS 6 (2014) (offering
proposals for updating the Bankruptcy Code). Senator Elizabeth Warren also recently released a
proposed overhaul of the consumer bankruptcy system. See Tucker Higgins, Elizabeth Warren
Unveils Plan to Overhaul Bankruptcy Laws, Spotlighting Differences with Biden, CNBC (Jan.
7, 2020, 9:37 AM), https://www.cnbc.com/2020/01/07/elizabeth-warren-unveils-bankruptcyagenda-targeting-joe-biden.html [https://perma.cc/7FJM-YSGS].
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both design and implementation, which suggests that bespoke bankruptcy
should not be widespread. Yet, bespoke bankruptcy can also provide
distinct benefits in the form of debt relief where none is otherwise
available. Part III thus turns to the question of when it is worthwhile for
Congress to engage in the process of designing specialized legislation. To
answer this question, Part III provides an eligibility test and four factors
to assess the need for bespoke relief. The eligibility test focuses on
viability, assessing the societal need for a particular entity due to the
public importance of the goods or services it provides. Entities that are
deemed too important to fail—and only these entities—should be
considered eligible for bespoke relief. Once entities have been identified
through the eligibility test, policymakers should weigh four factors to
determine whether bespoke relief is warranted: (1) how many of these
entities exist (numerosity); (2) how similar they are to each other
(similarity); (3) how well Code-based relief works or should work for
them (mismatch); and (4) the entities’ vulnerability to systemic risk and
exogenous shocks (vulnerability).
After articulating these steps, Part III provides an example of how to
apply them and, in doing so, illustrates that other subsovereigns—namely
states and municipalities—may benefit from bespoke relief. This Article
concludes by identifying further areas of research into bespoke
bankruptcy’s theory and application.
I. CODE-BASED BANKRUPTCY: THE STANDARD TEMPLATE
To understand bespoke bankruptcy, it is first necessary to understand
the primary source of U.S. bankruptcy law: the Bankruptcy Code. This
Article uses the term “Code-based bankruptcy” to distinguish relief
provided by the Bankruptcy Code from bespoke bankruptcy relief. This
Part first discusses core characteristics of all bankruptcy law (i.e.,
bespoke and Code-based) before turning to a discussion of Code-based
bankruptcy and its limitations.
A. Bankruptcy’s Core Characteristics
There is substantial debate over the purposes and procedures that
characterize U.S. bankruptcy law. For purposes of this Article, however,
“bankruptcy,” at its most basic, can be characterized using three
elements.
First, bankruptcy is a federal remedy that allows the debtor to impair
contracts and restructure its obligations.32 The Contract Clause of the
32. See Jonathan C. Lipson, Debt and Democracy: Towards a Constitutional Theory of
Bankruptcy, 83 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 605, 612–13 (2008) (discussing Congress’s power under the
Bankruptcy Clause and the elements of that power); Elizabeth Warren, Bankruptcy Policy, 54 U.
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Constitution prohibits states from impairing contracts; the Bankruptcy
Clause grants this power to the federal government instead.33 Thus,
“bankruptcy law” in the United States refers to federal, not state law.
Second, bankruptcy is a collective34 and compulsory process that
adjusts the relationship among a debtor and its creditors by resolving
competing creditors’ claims to limited assets.35 In this respect,
bankruptcy plays an important procedural role in centralizing both legal
conflict and asset distribution.36 Bankruptcy is a compulsory process:
once a bankruptcy case is filed, parties cannot “opt[] to sit out” in the
hope of something better.37 In order to reach an orderly resolution of
creditors’ claims, bankruptcy provides a defined priority scheme that
allows parties to understand where they rank in relation to each other in
their claims to the debtor’s property.38 These claims are sorted out in
bankruptcy court.

CHI. L. REV. 775, 790 (1987) (“Bankruptcy is simply a federal scheme designed to distribute the
costs among those at risk.”).
33. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 10, cl. 1 (“No State shall . . . pass any . . . Law impairing the
Obligation of Contracts . . . .”); U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 4 (“The Congress shall have
Power . . . To establish . . . uniform Laws on the subject of Bankruptcies throughout the United
States . . . .”); see also James L. Tatum III, To Disappear a City, 69 SYRACUSE L. REV. 105, 109
(2019) (“The Constitution’s Contract Clause impedes the ability of states and municipalities to
impair contracts.”).
34. See Skeel, supra note 18, at 2223 (observing that bankruptcy “is collective in nature”).
35. See Kenneth Ayotte & David A. Skeel Jr., Bankruptcy Law as a Liquidity Provider, 80
U. CHI. L. REV. 1557, 1560 (2013) (summarizing the creditors’ bargain theory of bankruptcy,
which focuses on creditor competition for limited assets); Alan Schwartz, Essay, A Contract
Theory Approach to Business Bankruptcy, 107 YALE L.J. 1807, 1807 (1998) (“Business
bankruptcy systems attempt to solve a coordination problem for the creditors of insolvent firms.”);
but see Douglas G. Baird & Anthony J. Casey, No Exit? Withdrawal Rights and the Law of
Corporate Reorganizations, 113 COLUM. L. REV. 1, 5 (2013) (pushing back on the idea that
corporate bankruptcy is a mandatory regime when investors can partition asssets into different
legal entities, thus creating a regime that allows a limited number of investors to effectively opt
out of the bankruptcy process).
36. See Warren, supra note 32, at 793 (“A process such as bankruptcy [is] designed to
consider the rights of more than two parties and to distribute the losses occasioned by the debtor’s
failure . . . .”); Douglas G. Baird, Loss Distribution, Forum Shopping, and Bankruptcy: A Reply
to Warren, 54 U. CHI. L. REV. 815, 824 (1987) (“[B]ankruptcy law is a procedure in which the
actions of those with rights to the assets of a firm are stayed and the affairs of the firm are sorted
out in an orderly way.”).
37. Vincent S.J. Buccola, Law and Legislation in Municipal Bankruptcy, 38 CARDOZO L.
REV. 1301, 1302 (2017) (“[T]he regime is compulsory, meaning that on a showing of the debtor’s
insolvency no claimant to the contested assets can unilaterally prevent the bankruptcy process
from taking its course or do better by opting to sit out.”).
38. See id. at 1306 (asserting that “defined rights to a debtor’s assets” is a theme of
bankruptcy law).
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Third, bankruptcy provides breathing space to enable value
maximization.39 The debtor uses this breathing space to assess whether it
is viable as a going concern or whether value maximization (for a debtor’s
stakeholders)40 would instead occur through a liquidation.41 Depending
on the outcome of this assessment, bankruptcy serves one of two
purposes. If a debtor can continue as a going concern, bankruptcy is
rehabilitative in nature, providing a fresh start and a discharge of debts to
the debtor.42 In contrast, if the debtor does not continue as a going
concern, bankruptcy provides an orderly process for value-maximizing
liquidation.43
At its most basic, then, bankruptcy can be described as a coordinated
federal process that provides for breathing space to enable value
maximization.44 This indicates that entities benefit from bankruptcy when
they have dispersed legal conflicts, need breathing space to enable valuemaximizing decisions, or need federal law’s power to break contracts.
Although the Bankruptcy Code provides mechanisms through which
debtors can take advantage of bankruptcy relief, the Code is not the
exclusive means through which an entity can achieve bankruptcy relief.45
Thus, the concept of “bankruptcy” is broader than the mechanisms
contained within the Bankruptcy Code.46

39. See Laura N. Coordes, Gatekeepers Gone Wrong: Reforming the Chapter 9 Eligibility
Rules, 94 WASH. U. L. REV. 1191, 1212 (2017) (discussing how Chapter 9 bankruptcy provides
breathing space and the ability to overcome holdouts and modify agreements on a nonconsensual
basis).
40. See Jay Lawrence Westbrook, The Control of Wealth in Bankruptcy, 82 TEX. L. REV.
795, 821 & n.94 (2004) (citing literature that illustrates agreement among scholars on the
bankruptcy goal of “the maximization of distributions to beneficiaries”).
41. See Matthew Adam Bruckner, Higher Ed “Do Not Resuscitate” Orders, 106 KY. L.J.
223, 241–42 (2017) (noting that bankruptcy reorganization is appropriate when it enhances value
for the parties).
42. See Tatum, supra note 33, at 114 (2019) (discussing how the rehabilitative objectives of
Chapters 9 and 11 are responses to financial, rather than economic, distress); ELIZABETH WARREN
ET AL., THE LAW OF DEBTORS AND CREDITORS 343 (7th ed. 2014) (discussing the importance of
discharge and how it “is the exclusive province of federal bankruptcy law”).
43. See Tatum, supra note 33, at 115 (noting that Chapter 7 is the Code’s response to
companies experiencing economic distress).
44. Professor David Skeel provides a similar description of bankruptcy’s core attributes.
See Skeel, supra note 18, at 2222–23 (describing bankruptcy as (1) enabling a debtor to restructure
obligations; (2) imposed or facilitated by government or another third party; (3) collective; and
(4) specific to a particular entity or individual).
45. See id. at 2223–24.
46. Id. at 2225; see also Andrew B. Dawson, Better Than Bankruptcy?, 69 RUTGERS U. L.
REV. 137, 145 (2016) (discussing assignments for the benefit of creditors).
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B. Code-Based Bankruptcy and Its Limitations
In the United States, the Bankruptcy Code is the primary source of
bankruptcy law.47 To better understand the purposes and aims of the
Bankruptcy Code, it is helpful to examine the Code’s structure and
history, as well as the legal scholarship surrounding Code-based
bankruptcy law.
The Bankruptcy Code primarily centers around two types of entities:
businesses and consumers. The bulk of the Bankruptcy Code, and the
Code’s most frequently used provisions, are created for (and used by)
these two entity types.48 Indeed, the Bankruptcy Code provides multiple
avenues for both businesses and consumers to file for bankruptcy. A
business can liquidate under Chapter 7 or reorganize under Chapter 11.49
An individual may liquidate assets under Chapter 7 or reorganize debts
under either Chapters 11 or 13.50 Both individuals and businesses can
initiate cross-border proceedings using Chapter 15.51
The history of U.S. bankruptcy law also illustrates U.S. bankruptcy’s
business and consumer focus. Early federal bankruptcy laws in the United
States focused on addressing the debts of merchants and individuals.52
When the Bankruptcy Code was enacted in 1978, it made bankruptcy
more attractive to both individuals and businesses.53 As a result, both
types of entities use the Code extensively. For businesses, corporate
bankruptcy has become “a business and strategic decision rather than a
last resort.”54 For individuals, estimates suggest that about 10% of the

47. See Comment, Bankruptcy—Security Interests in Principal Residences: Chapter 13
Bifurcation of Undersecured Claims—a Potential Crack Down on Cramdowns, 69 N.D. L. REV.
241, 243 (1993).
48. See Overview of Bankruptcy Chapters, U.S. DEP’T. JUST., https://www.justice.gov/ust/
bankruptcy-fact-sheets/overview-bankruptcy-chapters [https://perma.cc/A8CJ-6CDW] (overviewing the Code’s “principal chapters,” and noting that Chapter 7 “is a liquidation proceeding
available to consumers and businesses,” Chapter 11 “provides a procedure by which an individual
or a business can reorganize its debts,” Chapter 12 “allows a family farmer or a fisherman to file
for bankruptcy,” and Chapter 13 “is used primarily by individual consumers”).
49. See What Is the US Bankruptcy Code?, CORP. FIN. INST., https://corporatefinance
institute.com/resources/knowledge/other/us-bankruptcy-code/ [https://perma.cc/P6VC-EAX6].
50. See id.
51. See id.
52. See David Haynes, History of Bankruptcy in the United States, BALANCE (Feb. 13,
2020), https://www.thebalance.com/history-of-bankruptcy-in-the-united-states-316225 [https://
perma.cc/U88K-V78Q].
53. See Todd J. Zywicki, The Past, Present, and Future of Bankruptcy Law in America, 101
MICH. L. REV. 2016, 2021 (2003) (reviewing DAVID A. SKEEL, JR., DEBT’S DOMINION: A HISTORY
OF BANKRUPTCY LAW IN AMERICA (2001)).
54. Id.
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current U.S. population—some 36 million individuals—have filed for
bankruptcy.55
Existing legal scholarship also tends to focus predominantly on
business and consumer debtors. For example, much ink has been spilled
over the proper purpose of corporate bankruptcy law, with scholars such
as Professor Douglas Baird and Professor Thomas Jackson taking the
position that it should reflect, or vindicate, the deal creditors would strike
if they had the chance to bargain ex ante,56 and those such as Senator
Elizabeth Warren and Professor Jay Westbrook arguing that corporate
bankruptcy can serve public interests and other stakeholders, such as
employees, in addition to creditors.57 Over time, other scholars have
expanded, developed, and commented upon the work of these
foundational theorists, creating a rich and nuanced discussion of the role
and purposes of corporate bankruptcy.58
On the consumer bankruptcy side, there is a similarly rich literature
that seeks to develop and understand the purposes and aims of consumer
bankruptcy law.59 Much of the consumer literature also focuses on
55. Bob Lawless, How Many People Have Filed Bankruptcy?, CREDIT SLIPS (June 22, 2020,
8:09 PM), creditslips.org/creditslips/2020/06/how-many-people-have-filed-bankruptcy.html
[https://perma.cc/HD3W-LVUB].
56. See Douglas G. Baird & Thomas H. Jackson, Corporate Reorganizations and the
Treatment of Diverse Ownership Interests: A Comment on Adequate Protection of Secured
Creditors in Bankruptcy, 51 U. CHI. L. REV. 97, 100 (1984); Thomas H. Jackson, Bankruptcy,
Non-Bankruptcy Entitlements, and the Creditors’ Bargain, 91 YALE L.J. 857, 860 (1982) (“A more
profitable line of pursuit might be to view bankruptcy as a system designed to mirror the
agreement one would expect the creditors to form among themselves were they able to negotiate
such an agreement from an ex ante position.”).
57. See, e.g., Warren, supra note 32, at 777 (“I see bankruptcy as an attempt to reckon with
a debtor’s multiple defaults and to distribute the consequences among a number of different
actors.”); Elizabeth Warren & Jay Lawrence Westbrook, Financial Characteristics of Businesses
in Bankruptcy, 73 AM. BANKR. L.J. 499, 500–01 (1999) (discussing “propositions that can be
stated as a matter of conventional wisdom” and noting, inter alia, that “Congress embraced
reorganization with an explicit concern toward saving jobs”); Jay Lawrence Westbrook,
Commercial Law and the Public Interest, 4 PENN ST. J.L. & INT’L AFFS. 445, 451 (2015) (noting
“the lack of apparent concern with a public interest” in the scholarly literature).
58. See, e.g., Anthony J. Casey, Chapter 11’s Renegotiation Framework and the Purpose
of Corporate Bankruptcy, 120 COLUM. L. REV. 1709, 1721–27 (2020) (advancing a theory of
corporate bankruptcy where the goal is to resolve an incomplete contracting problem that occurs
due to the uncertainty that characterizes financial distress); Melissa B. Jacoby, Corporate
Bankruptcy Hybridity, 166 U. PA. L. REV. 1715, 1717 (2018) (developing a model of corporate
bankruptcy as a public-private partnership); Jonathan C. Lipson, The Secret Life of Priority:
Corporate Reorganization After Jevic, 93 WASH. L. REV. 631, 631 (2018) (downplaying the
importance of efficiency in corporate bankruptcy).
59. See Pamela Foohey, New Article from the Consumer Bankruptcy Project: Attorneys’
Fees and Chapter Choice, CREDIT SLIPS (Mar. 6, 2017, 8:00 AM), https://www.creditslips.org/
creditslips/2017/03/new-article-from-the-consumer-bankruptcy-project-attorneys-fees-andchapter-choice.html?utm_source=feedburner&utm_medium=feed&utm_campaign=Feed%3A+
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chapter choice, asking when consumers should use Chapter 7
(liquidation) as opposed to Chapter 13 (individual debt reorganization).60
The Bankruptcy Code, and the commentary surrounding it, is thus
primarily focused on how best to provide relief to businesses and
consumers. A consequence of this focus is Congress’s heavy reliance on
previously established business and consumer templates when asked to
modify the Bankruptcy Code to accommodate debtors that do not neatly
fit the business and consumer molds. For example, as Congress
developed Chapter 9 of the Bankruptcy Code to address municipal debt
restructuring, it borrowed from Chapter 11—the chapter designed
primarily for business reorganizations61—even though municipalities are
substantially different from businesses in both form and function.62
Similarly, when Congress created Chapter 12 for family farmers and
family fishermen, it used portions of both Chapters 11 (business
reorganizations) and 13 (individual debtors), although the way these
borrowed provisions work in Chapter 12 is substantially different from
the contexts of Chapters 11 and 13.63
At bottom, the Bankruptcy Code is a series of widely applicable,
standardized processes that many entities can use to attain debt relief.
There is a core set of common ideas and procedures, which is shared
among most or all chapters.64 These ideas and procedures have been
battle-tested and refined through decades of jurisprudence. Although the
Code does contain some flexibility to accommodate nonbusiness,
nonconsumer debtors, it ultimately relies on this set of standard
templates, which are designed primarily for businesses and consumers.65
Such standard templates, with their embedded rules and norms, are a key
creditslips%2Ffeed+%28Credit+Slips%29 [https://perma.cc/JJ2D-Q68U] (discussing the
Consumer Bankruptcy Project, “a long-term research project studying people who file chapter 7
and 13 bankruptcy”).
60. Pamela Foohey et al., Attorneys’ Fees and Chapter Choice, 36 AM. BANKR. INST. J., 20,
20 (2017) (“One of the most important choices that individuals considering bankruptcy face is
whether to file for chapter 7 or 13.”).
61. See Tatum, supra note 33, at 110 (observing that each time that Congress has amended
Chapter 9, it has become more like Chapter 11).
62. See Laura Napoli Coordes, Restructuring Municipal Bankruptcy, 2016 UTAH L. REV.
307, 315 (2016) (discussing the difficulty of using Chapter 11 rules to address a municipality’s
“vastly different” problems).
63. LISA P. SUMNER, COMPARISON: CHAPTER 11 VS CHAPTER 12 VS CHAPTER 13, at 1 (2018),
https://www.nexsenpruet.com/uploads/1498/doc/Comparison_Chapter_11_vs_Chapter_12_vs_
Chapter_13_(w-009-8719).pdf [https://perma.cc/75YZ-GS74] (“Chapter 12 incorporates many of
the same provisions of the Bankruptcy Code as do Chapter 11 and Chapter 13 but with significant
operative differences.”).
64. See generally 11 U.S.C. § 547 (preferences); 11 U.S.C. § 362 (automatic stay).
65. See What Is the US Bankruptcy Code?, supra note 49 (noting that the Code “governs
the procedures that businesses and individuals must follow when filing for bankruptcy” (emphasis
added)).
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benefit of a statutory scheme like the Bankruptcy Code.66 And for most
entities, the Code’s standard templates work well most of the time.67
However, not all entities are alike. Different means may be required
for different entities to achieve the same desired bankruptcy outcomes.68
To some extent, the Bankruptcy Code takes these differences into
account. For example, value maximization may play less of a role in
municipal bankruptcies, where the debtor at issue—a municipality—
must continue as a going concern due to the importance of the public
services it provides, even if it might make financial sense for that debtor
to sell off its assets and “liquidate.”69 Congress responded to this concern
by creating a separate Code chapter for municipalities.70
With regards to municipal bankruptcies, some scholars believe that
Congress did not go far enough.71 Indeed, bankruptcy theory might be
very different for debtors such as municipalities.72 For example,
Professor Vincent Buccola has proposed a new theory for municipal
bankruptcy, one where the goal is to preserve “spatial economies when
66. See Adam J. Levitin, Toward a Federal Common Law of Bankruptcy: Judicial
Lawmaking in a Statutory Regime, 80 AM. BANKR. L.J. 1, 2 (2006) (discussing how statutes create
“clear, one-size-fits-all rules”).
67. Indeed, even in a bespoke bankruptcy system like this Article discusses further below,
it makes good sense to retain many of the hallmarks of the Bankruptcy Code for purposes of
efficiency and reliability. For example, PROMESA retained many aspects of the Code’s standard
templates, while adding some features and modifying others. See David Skeel, Reflections on Two
Years of P.R.O.M.E.S.A., 87 REVISTA JURÍDICA UNIVERSIDAD DE P.R. 862, 864 (2018).
68. For an insightful account and analysis of U.S. business insolvency systems outside of
the Bankruptcy Code, see generally STEPHEN J. LUBBEN, THE LAW OF FAILURE: A TOUR THROUGH
THE WILDS OF AMERICAN BUSINESS INSOLVENCY LAW (2018).
69. See Laura N. Coordes, Formalizing Chapter 9’s Experts, 116 MICH. L. REV. 1249, 1257
(2018) (“In chapter 9, no liquidation alternative exists.”).
70. See Andrew B. Dawson, Beyond the Great Divide: Federalism Concerns in Municipal
Insolvency, 11 HARV. L. & POL’Y REV. 31, 40 (2017).
71. See, e.g., Coordes, supra note 69, at 1257 (describing the difficulty of applying plan
confirmation standards in a Chapter 9 case); Dawson, supra note 70, at 35 (advocating for a
functional approach to municipal bankruptcy that recognizes debt-governance overlap); Clayton
P. Gillette & David A. Skeel, Jr., Governance Reform and the Judicial Role in Municipal
Bankruptcy, 125 YALE L.J. 1150, 1206 (2016) (discussing a need for Chapter 9 to address
governance issues); Coordes, supra note 62, at 310 (arguing that the Chapter 9 framework is a
“poor fit” for municipalities); Clayton P. Gillette, Dictatorships for Democracy: Takeovers of
Financially Failed Cities, 114 COLUM. L. REV. 1373, 1384 (2014) (advocating for increased
authority for state-run takeover boards); Buccola, supra note 37, at 1301 (arguing that, due to
uncertainty about priorities in Chapter 9 and to the ability of multiple actors to veto the bankruptcy
process in the municipal context, traditional bankruptcy models do not adequately explain
municipal debt adjustment).
72. See, e.g., Adam J. Levitin, Bankrupt Politics and the Politics of Bankruptcy, 97
CORNELL L. REV. 1399, 1399 (2012) (proposing a theory of bankruptcy as the “‘armistice line’
between competing interest groups” and arguing that bankruptcy is an “expression of
distributional norms and interest group politics,” not an exercise in economic efficiency).
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public debt otherwise threatens to dissipate them.”73 Viewed in this light,
municipal bankruptcy is not about value maximization but rather survival
and preservation. However, the literature on municipal bankruptcy theory
remains sparse and, more generally, bankruptcy outside of the business
and consumer contexts is largely undertheorized.74
II. THE BANKRUPTCY MISFIT PROBLEM
To some extent, Congress has already begun to recognize that the
Bankruptcy Code’s standard templates do not always work well for some
of the entities that need bankruptcy relief. For example, as previously
discussed, a key characteristic of bankruptcy is its federal nature.
Municipalities, potential debtors in this federal system, are creatures of
the state in which they are located.75 When a municipality seeks to file
for bankruptcy, there is always a concern that the federal bankruptcy
process will interfere with the state’s right to govern its municipalities.76
To address this problem, the Bankruptcy Code allows the municipality to
access the federal bankruptcy system only upon the consent of the state
and only for the limited purpose of debt adjustment.77
However, the Bankruptcy Code does not account for all differences
among debtors. Sometimes, debtors’ differences can give rise to a
“bankruptcy misfit” problem: some debtors require such different
mechanisms that using the Bankruptcy Code becomes difficult,
impractical, or even impossible, thereby leaving these debtors unable to
obtain bankruptcy relief.78 These bankruptcy misfits are a natural
consequence of the Bankruptcy Code since it groups together debtors
under chapters for efficiency and ease of administration.79 Bankruptcy
73. Vincent S.J. Buccola, The Logic and Limits of Municipal Bankruptcy Law, 86 U. CHI.
L. REV. 817, 821 (2019).
74. A marked exception to this is an article by Professor Skeel, who seeks to develop a
comprehensive theory of when bankruptcy is necessary. Skeel, supra note 18, at 2230–31
(proposing a five-factor framework to determine when bankruptcy should be available to a
particular entity).
75. See Coordes, supra note 62, at 345–46 (“Unlike a business, a municipality is never truly
a discrete entity—it is always a creature of the state and/or federal government.”).
76. See Ashton v. Cameron Cnty. Water Improvement Dist., 298 U.S. 513, 530–31 (1936)
(articulating this concern).
77. See 11 U.S.C. § 109(c)(2) (providing that a state must specifically authorize a
municipality to file for Chapter 9); 11 U.S.C. § 903 (providing that states retain control over a
municipality’s “political or governmental powers”).
78. Coordes, supra note 27, at 423.
79. Although the Bankruptcy Code does provide courts some flexibility to tailor the process
to debtors’ needs through § 105(a), the provision widely thought to give bankruptcy courts equity
powers, it is far from clear that the equity powers of the bankruptcy courts can be used to
accommodate many bankruptcy misfits. See 11 U.S.C. § 105(a). Indeed, the U.S. Supreme Court
has recently held that a bankruptcy court’s equitable powers cannot be used to contravene the
Code’s statutory provisions. Law v. Siegel, 571 U.S. 415, 421 (2014).
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misfits are the exception to the rule that the Code’s chapters mostly work
for most debtors.
Before delving more deeply into the bankruptcy misfit problem, it is
important to recognize at the outset that not all bankruptcy misfits need
bankruptcy law. If nonbankruptcy techniques are better suited to
resolving an entity’s financial distress, excluding that entity from
bankruptcy does not pose a problem. For example, the federal
government has typically stepped in with bailout funds for struggling
insurance companies, and many of these entities are prohibited from
filing for bankruptcy under the Code.80 In other cases, there are salient
political, practical, and legal considerations that may outweigh a
particular entity’s need or desire for federal bankruptcy relief.81 This
Article’s proposed framework is designed to help assess these
considerations against the entity’s need for bankruptcy,82 doing for
bankruptcy law what other scholars have done in the bailout context for
decades.83
On the other hand, some bankruptcy misfits do exhibit a need for
bankruptcy and are not accommodated by the Bankruptcy Code. There is
a “default assumption” among scholars and policymakers that bankruptcy
relief should be widely available to those that need it.84 And although
some bankruptcy misfits exhibit a demonstrated need for bankruptcy
relief, use of the Bankruptcy Code creates significant problems that may
outweigh any practical benefits of the bankruptcy process.85 These misfits
have no effective way to access bankruptcy’s core elements, even with a
demonstrated need for them.86

80. See, e.g., Mark Koba, Dodd-Frank Act: CNBC Explains, CNBC (Apr. 30, 2012, 11:17
AM), https://www.cnbc.com/id/47075854 [https://perma.cc/FQQ9-SM8Z] (noting that after AIG
found itself in a liquidity crisis in 2008, the U.S. Federal Reserve Bank created an $85 billion
emergency fund to assist it).
81. For example, the fact that marijuana is illegal at the federal level impedes access to
federal bankruptcy relief for entities and people operating marijuana businesses that are legal at
the state level. For a discussion of some of these issues, see generally Vivian Cheng, Comment,
Medical Marijuana Dispensaries in Chapter 11 Bankruptcy, 30 EMORY BANKR. DEV. J. 105
(2013).
82. See infra Part III.
83. See, e.g., Cheryl D. Block, Overt and Covert Bailouts: Developing a Public Bailout
Policy, 67 IND. L.J. 951, 987–88 (1992); Ann E. Cudd, A Contractarian Approach to Corporate
Bailouts, 11 GEO. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 283, 284–85 (2013); Jeffrey Manns, Building Better Bailouts:
The Case for a Long-Term Investment Approach, 63 FLA. L. REV. 1349, 1349 (2011) (proposing a
framework to address future financial bailouts).
84. Bruckner, supra note 41, at 242.
85. See, e.g., Laura N. Coordes, Beyond the Bankruptcy Code: A New Statutory Bankruptcy
Regime for Tribal Debtors, 35 EMORY BANKR. DEVS. J. 363, 365–66 (2019) (explaining this issue
in the context of Indian tribes and tribal gaming corporations).
86. For an example of this and a discussion of Puerto Rico, see infra Part II.
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A. Accommodating Bankruptcy Misfits
The existence of bankruptcy misfits naturally leads to the question of
what should be done for entities that the Bankruptcy Code does not
accommodate. In the past, when Code-based bankruptcy did not or would
not work for an entity, Congress has responded by either amending the
Bankruptcy Code or creating bespoke bankruptcy. Each tactic is
described in more detail below.
1. Bankruptcy Code Amendments
Congress has shown a willingness to amend the Bankruptcy Code to
accommodate some bankruptcy misfits. Two early examples are the Code
chapters designed to address municipal debt and the debts of family
farmers and family fishermen: Chapters 9 and 12, respectively.87 In
addition, Congress has sometimes provided special subchapters within
existing Bankruptcy Code chapters for specific types of debtors. The
most recent and salient example of this is the Small Business
Reorganization Act of 2019,88 which created a new Subchapter V within
Chapter 11.89
a. Chapter 9
Chapter 9 is the chapter of the Bankruptcy Code that Congress created
to address municipal debt adjustment. During the Great Depression, U.S.
municipalities began defaulting on their debts in record numbers.90 At
that time, they had no access to bankruptcy relief; however, in 1933,
Congress amended what was then the Bankruptcy Act to provide for
municipal debt adjustment.91 After making some changes in response to
concerns about the constitutionality of a federal system of municipal debt
adjustment, Congress made the amendments a permanent part of the
Bankruptcy Code.92
Congress had to enact a new Code chapter rather than simply make
municipalities eligible for Code-based bankruptcy relief because
municipalities could not have used the bankruptcy laws as they existed at
87. 11 U.S.C. §§ 901–46, 1201–32.
88. Pub. L. No. 116-54, 133 Stat. 1079 (codified at 11 U.S.C. §§ 1181–95).
89. See id. For a discussion of how Subchapter V is specifically crafted to help small
businesses in Chapter 11, see Christopher G. Bradley, The New Small Business Bankruptcy Game:
Strategies for Creditors Under the Small Business Reorganization Act, 28 AM. BANKR. INST. L.
REV. 251, 257 (2020).
90. See Daniel J. Freyberg, Comment, Municipal Bankruptcy and Express State
Authorization to be a Chapter 9 Debtor: Current State Approaches to Municipal Insolvency and
What Will States Do Now?, 23 OHIO N. U. L. REV. 1001, 1002 (1997).
91. Vincent S.J. Buccola, Who Does Bankruptcy? Mapping Pension Impairment in Chapter
9, 33 REV. BANKING & FIN. L. 585, 592 (2014).
92. See Coordes, supra note 62, at 313.
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the time. This is because municipalities were so functionally different
from the individual and business debtors that the existing bankruptcy law
was designed to serve.93 Unlike a business, a municipality could not
liquidate or sell many of its primary assets.94 Unlike consumers,
municipalities could—in theory at least—generate revenue for debt
payments through taxation.95
In many ways, Chapter 9 functions as a modified version of Chapter
11.96 Although Chapter 9 is supposed to address the unique needs and
goals of municipalities in bankruptcy, Congress has, over the years,
modeled Chapter 9 to look like Chapter 11.97 This is so even though the
existing bankruptcy literature suggests that Chapter 9 should have
distinctly different features.98 In practice, however, Chapter 9 cases have
been described as “vastly different than any other type of bankruptcy
case, with many surprising and unique qualities.”99
Although Chapter 9 applies a version of Chapter 11’s toolkit to
municipalities, it does account for the differences between a municipality
and a commercial or consumer entity in several ways.100 Chief among
these are Chapter 9’s eligibility requirements: unlike most business
debtors, municipalities face significant hurdles before they can access
bankruptcy relief, including the need for the state in which they are
located to specifically authorize them to file.101 If a municipal debtor is
deemed eligible for bankruptcy, the municipality’s relationship with its
creditors and the court is also different from that of a typical commercial
or consumer debtor. For example, only the municipality can submit a plan
of debt adjustment, and the bankruptcy court’s powers are more limited
with respect to the municipality’s property and political affairs.102

93. Skeel, supra note 18, at 2220.
94. Coordes, supra note 62, at 328.
95. See Skeel, supra note 18, at 2232.
96. See Coordes, supra note 62, at 315 (observing that “Chapter 9 borrows most of its
provisions from other chapters of the Bankruptcy Code” and that “[i]ts most prominent contributor
is Chapter 11”).
97. See Tatum, supra note 33, at 110 (noting that Congress has amended Chapter 9 to
become more like Chapter 11).
98. See Coordes, supra note 62, at 315 (discussing the difficulty of using Chapter 11 rules
to address a municipality’s “vastly different” problems).
99. Bill Pepper, Is the Gate Open for West Virginia Counties and Cities to File for Chapter
9 Bankruptcy Relief?, 121 W. VA. L. REV. 883, 884 (2019).
100. Bruckner, supra note 8, at 349–53 (noting salient differences between Chapters 9 and
11).
101. See 11 U.S.C. § 109(c) (listing the requirements for Chapter 9 eligibility).
102. See 11 U.S.C. §§ 903–04 (affirming the state’s powers over the municipality and
limiting the bankruptcy court’s ability to interfere); Omer Kimhi, Chapter 9 of the Bankruptcy
Code: A Solution in Search of a Problem, 27 YALE J. ON REG. 351, 356–57 (2010).
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b. Chapter 12
After it became evident that family farmers and family fishermen
could not effectively use existing Bankruptcy Code provisions, Congress
created Chapter 12 to provide a specialized debt restructuring process for
these bankruptcy misfits.103 To understand why a specialized process is
necessary, it is helpful to examine the unique nature of a family farmer
debtor. Unlike most businesses or individuals with predictable income
streams, a farmer’s income is often volatile and can fluctuate wildly.104
Farmers typically take out a line of credit from a single lender, which they
repay in full on a yearly basis rather than making monthly payments.105
After the collapse of the farm economy in the 1980s, family farmers
found Chapter 11 of the Bankruptcy Code to be functionally useless to
them.106 The volatility of the farmers’ income meant that they frequently
lacked the means to provide adequate protection to their creditors.107 If a
secured creditor did not receive adequate protection from the farmer, the
creditor could lift the automatic stay, effectively ending the breathing
space for the farmer, and foreclose on the farmer’s land.108 Furthermore,
Chapter 11’s absolute priority rule, which requires full repayment of
debts to creditors before equity holders can receive anything, prohibited
most farmers from proposing a reorganization plan in which they retained
ownership of the farm, because most farmers did not have the funds to
repay creditors in full.109
Family farmers were similarly unable to use Chapter 13, which is
designed for the adjustment of individual debt. In addition to the
problems discussed below with respect to Chapter 13 for small
businesses, Chapter 13’s debt limits were too low for most farmers, and
its requirement that plans must be completed in five years or less did not
give most farmers sufficient time.110 In response to a wave of defaults
“reminiscent of the Great Depression” hitting the family farm industry,
Congress created Chapter 12 of the Bankruptcy Code in 1986.111
Like Chapter 9, Chapter 12 draws heavily from existing chapters of
the Bankruptcy Code—in this case, from Chapters 11 and 13, the two

103. See Jamey Mavis Lowdermilk, A Fighting Chance? Small Family Farmers and How
Little We Know, 86 TENN. L. REV. 177, 181 (2018).
104. Id. at 184.
105. See id. at 183.
106. See id. at 188.
107. Id. at 189.
108. See id.
109. Id.
110. See id.
111. Id. (quoting Mike Lowry, A New Paint Job on an ’85 Yugo: BAPCPA Improves Chapter
12 but Will It Really Make a Difference?, 12 DRAKE J. AGRIC. L. 231, 239 (2007)).
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provisions farmers found themselves unable to use.112 For example, under
Chapter 12, like in Chapter 13, there is no creditor vote on a plan.113
Instead, unsecured creditors must receive all of the debtor’s disposable
income during the plan term and must also receive at least what they
would have received in a liquidation under Chapter 7.114 The practical
effect of these provisions is that family farmers can keep their farms even
if they do not pay their creditors in full, thus overcoming the limitations
of Chapter 11’s absolute priority rule.115 However, Chapter 12 also
contains some provisions that are unique to that chapter.116 For example,
it allows debtors to write down debt secured by a principal residence.117
Chapter 12 provides many benefits for family farmers and fishermen,
enabling preservation of farm values and providing “increased leverage”
for debtors.118 Though far from perfect, it offers relief to a particular class
of debtors not otherwise addressed in the Bankruptcy Code.119
c. Subchapter V
At first glance, it may seem exceedingly odd to have a separate
bankruptcy process for small businesses. After all, small businesses are
businesses—one of the groups the Bankruptcy Code was primarily
designed to assist. Over the years, however, it became increasingly clear
to Congress that Chapter 11 of the Bankruptcy Code primarily worked
well for larger businesses, even though “most chapter 11 business cases
are filed by small business debtors.”120
Small business debtors were bankruptcy misfits because the available
Bankruptcy Code chapters did not work well for them. Chapter 13, which
some small business owners could use as individual debtors, had debt

112. See SUMNER, supra note 63, at 1 (“Chapter 12 incorporates many of the same provisions
of the Bankruptcy Code as do Chapter 11 and Chapter 13 but with significant operative
differences.”); Lowdermilk, supra note 103, at 190 (“The family farmer chapter is essentially a
‘hybrid of’ chapters 11 and 13, but it is limited only to those engaged in farming or fishing.”
(footnote omitted) (quoting Katherine M. Porter, Phantom Farmers: Chapter 12 of the
Bankruptcy Code, 79 AM. BANKR. L.J. 729, 732 (2005))).
113. Lowdermilk, supra note 103, at 191.
114. Id.
115. Id.
116. See id.
117. See 11 U.S.C. § 1222.
118. Lowdermilk, supra note 103, at 196–97.
119. Id. (observing that “[w]ithout chapter 12, many thousands of family farms would have
been foreclosed, and depressed farm values would have sunk even lower” (quoting Extension of
the Family Farmer Bankruptcy Act: Hearing on H.R. 5322 Before the Subcomm. on Econ. & Com.
L. of the H. Comm. on the Judiciary, 102d Cong. 21 (1992) (statement of Judge A. Thomas Small,
J., Bankr. E.D.N.C.))).
120. H.R. REP. NO. 116–171, at 3 (2019).
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limits that were simply too low for many small business owners.121 Other
aspects of the Chapter 13 process, which is designed to address personal
debt, did not work for small businesses that were not sole proprietors.122
Additionally, small business owners were often excluded from Chapter 7
bankruptcy thanks to the means test.123 This meant that the only option
for which small business debtors were eligible was Chapter 11. And
Chapter 11, designed primarily with large businesses in mind, was often
too expensive and demanding for a small business debtor.124
To address the unique needs of small businesses, Congress enacted
the Small Business Reorganization Act of 2019, which created a special
Subchapter V within Chapter 11 to address the needs of small
businesses.125 Any “small business debtor,” defined as “a person engaged
in commercial or business activities . . . that has aggregate noncontingent
liquidated secured and unsecured debts . . . in an amount not more than
$2,725,625 . . . not less than 50 percent of which arose from the
commercial or business activities of the debtor,” may elect to reorganize
under Subchapter V.126 Once a debtor elects Subchapter V, the case is
designed to proceed much more quickly than an ordinary Chapter 11.127
In general, there is no need for the debtor to submit a disclosure statement
with its plan,128 and there is no creditors’ committee.129 In addition, the
debtor is the only entity that can file a plan of reorganization.130
Although Chapter 11 cases typically do not involve the appointment
of a trustee or examiner, if a small business debtor elects to use
Subchapter V, a trustee will be appointed as a matter of course. 131 The
Subchapter V trustee’s primary tasks are to help the debtor work toward
121. See Robert C. Meyer, Small Business Reorganization Act Arrives This Month, AM.
BANKR. INST. J., Feb. 1, 2020, at 8, 8.
122. See Amelia Niemi, Chapter 13 Bankruptcy & Small Business Owners, UPSOLVE (Sept.
3, 2020), https://upsolve.org/learn/business-bankruptcy-chapter-13/ [https://perma.cc/L66LK4AX] (discussing how, in a Chapter 13 bankruptcy, the business is still responsible for debt
repayment if it is a separate legal entity from the owner).
123. See Meyer, supra note 121, at 9.
124. See id. at 1 (noting that Chapter 11 requires “fees that are tenfold or more over what a
chapter 13 costs” and “extensive writing in the form of disclosure statements, plans and more”).
125. See Pub. L. No. 116-54, 133 Stat. 1079 (codified at 11 U.S.C. §§ 1181–95).
126. 11 U.S.C. § 101(51D). Recently, Congress amended Subchapter V in response to the
economic crisis the COVID-19 global pandemic created by temporarily increasing the debt limit
for Subchapter V eligibility to $7.5 million. See Robb Mandelbaum, A New Small Business
Bankruptcy Law Takes Effect, Just In Time, BLOOMBERG BUSINESSWEEK (Apr. 17, 2020, 8:15
AM), https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2020-04-17/a-new-small-business-bankruptcylaw-takes-effect-just-in-time [https://perma.cc/75D4-TZD2].
127. See, e.g., 11 U.S.C. § 1188(a) (requiring a court to hold status conference within sixty
days); id. § 1189(b) (requiring a debtor to file a plan within ninety days).
128. See 11 U.S.C. § 1190(1).
129. See 11 U.S.C. § 1181(b).
130. Id. § 1189(a).
131. See 11 U.S.C. § 1183.
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a consensual reorganization plan and, once the plan is confirmed, to
ensure that the debtor makes its plan payments.132 In addition, there are
different requirements for plan confirmation under Subchapter V,
including a modification of Chapter 11’s absolute priority rule.133 This
modification allows small business owners to retain their businesses even
if they do not pay their creditors in full, provided they commit all of their
disposable income to plan payments during the life of the plan.134
While Chapter 11 was designed for businesses, Congress eventually
realized that the time, expense, and resources required to successfully
complete a Chapter 11 bankruptcy case were “cumbersome for even
medium-sized businesses.”135 By modifying the absolute priority rule, the
new Subchapter V allows business owners to retain their ownership of
the business, provided they meet certain requirements.136 Many of the
other provisions of Subchapter V “streamline[] the path to
reorganization” for small business debtors by removing requirements that
are both time-consuming and expensive, such as preparation of a
disclosure statement.137
Despite being housed within Chapter 11, the new Subchapter V
functions as a combination of Chapters 11, 12, and 13.138 Congress
selected provisions from each of these chapters to fashion relief that is
better suited to the particular needs of small business debtors.139
2. Bespoke Bankruptcy
In addition to modifying the Bankruptcy Code, Congress has
occasionally created bespoke bankruptcy—non-Code bankruptcy law
designed for a particular group of debtors—in response to a perceived
need to help bankruptcy misfits. Although bespoke bankruptcy contains
132. Id. §§ 1183(b)(4), (b)(7).
133. See id. § 1181.
134. See 11 U.S.C. § 1191(c)(2).
135. Bob Lawless, The Small Business Reorganization Act of 2019 and COVID-19, CREDIT
SLIPS (Mar. 15, 2020, 2:40 PM), https://www.creditslips.org/creditslips/2020/03/the-smallbusiness-reorganization-act-of-2019-and-covid-19.html?utm_source=feedburner&utm_medium
=email&utm_campaign=Feed%3A+creditslips%2Ffeed+%28Credit+Slips%29 [https://perma.cc
/2Z9S-AM36].
136. See id.
137. Id.
138. See id. (“Congress modeled the SBRA on Chapter 12 of the Bankruptcy Code which
has been used successfully, for years, to restructure the debts of family farmers with debts (now)
up to $10 million.”).
139. Of course, Subchapter V is not the only instance where Congress has created modified
versions of a Bankruptcy Code chapter for certain debtors. Other subchapters provide for special
legal regimes to handle the financial distress of entities that are not traditional businesses,
including for railroads and stockbrokers. See, e.g., 11 U.S.C. §§ 1161–74 (railroad
reorganization); 11 U.S.C. §§ 741–54 (stockbroker liquidation).
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the fundamental elements of bankruptcy described in Part I, this relief is
provided outside of the Bankruptcy Code’s statutory scheme.
a. Dodd-Frank
Dodd-Frank provides for an orderly liquidation process for distressed
financial institutions that is overseen by the Federal Deposit Insurance
Corporation (FDIC).140 “During the darkest days of the Great Recession,
Congress rushed through [Dodd-Frank] . . . in order to show it had done
something before the 2010 mid-term elections.”141 Dodd-Frank
recognizes that certain financial institutions that are “too big to fail”
should be subject to more regulation and oversight through, for example,
the submission of “living wills” to a federal regulator.142 When ex ante
regulation fails to prevent financial distress, however, Dodd-Frank also
provides for a collective process that “discharges the debtor’s
obligations.”143 Specifically, it allows regulators to control the resolution
process—a nod to the insolvency procedures banks and insurance
companies use outside of bankruptcy.144
Congress enacted Dodd-Frank two years after the 2008 financial
crisis as part of a broader attempt at bank reform.145 Although bank
holding companies may file for bankruptcy, banks themselves may not;
instead, the FDIC acts as a receiver when a bank experiences financial
distress.146 Congress enacted Dodd-Frank to strengthen bank regulation
and to minimize systemic risk in the event that a systemically important
financial institution (SIFI) were to succumb to distress.147
Under Dodd-Frank’s “orderly liquidation mechanism,” the FDIC, as
receiver, can seize, break up, and wind down a SIFI in distress.148 Dodd140. See Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, Pub. L. No. 111203, 124 Stat. 1376, 1377 (2010) (codified as amended in scattered sections of 7, 12, 15, 18, 22,
31, 42 U.S.C.).
141. James J. Angel, What Dodd-Frank Left Unfinished in Financial Reform, FORTUNE
(July 22, 2015, 1:27 PM), https://fortune.com/2015/07/22/what-dodd-frank-left-unfinished-infinancial-reform-five-year-anniversary/ [https://perma.cc/3H64-Y3PU].
142. 124 Stat. at 1376; Living Wills (or Resolution Plans), BD. GOVERNORS FED. RSRV. SYS.,
https://www.federalreserve.gov/supervisionreg/resolution-plans.htm
[https://perma.cc/ANZ7KA9T].
143. Skeel, supra note 18, at 2225.
144. See id. at 2224–25.
145. See MORRISON & FOERSTER, THE DODD-FRANK ACT: A CHEAT SHEET 8, 14, 16 (2010),
http://media.mofo.com/files/uploads/Images/SummaryDoddFrankAct.pdf [https://perma.cc/G6
VC-PAQ4].
146. See Richard M. Hynes & Steven D. Walt, Why Banks Are Not Allowed in Bankruptcy,
67 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 985, 986–87 (2010).
147. David S. Huntington, Summary of Dodd-Frank Financial Regulation Legislation,
HARV. L. SCH. F. ON CORP. GOVERNANCE (July 7, 2010), https://corpgov.law.harvard.edu/2010/
07/07/summary-of-dodd-frank-financial-regulation-legislation/ [https://perma.cc/PTZ4-VUYA].
148. Id.
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Frank also provides for government loans to the SIFI that are backed by
its assets and ultimately repaid either during the resolution process or
from other SIFIs.149
Congress enacted Dodd-Frank instead of amending the Bankruptcy
Code based on the belief that “[t]he failure of a systemically important
financial institution is materially different from that of most nonfinancial
businesses.”150 Dodd-Frank is a federal process for value-maximizing
liquidation.151 Together, the federal government and the FDIC play a
unique role in the orderly liquidation process in recognition of the fact
that SIFIs are substantially different from the debtors the Bankruptcy
Code was designed to accommodate.152
b. PROMESA
PROMESA, the debt relief legislation passed to assist Puerto Rico
and its territorial instrumentalities, is the most recent—and arguably most
prominent—example of bespoke bankruptcy. PROMESA is a federal
remedy that provides breathing space and the opportunity for an orderly,
collective process to resolve competing creditor claims.153 But
PROMESA encompasses other tools as well: the process is largely
steered by an oversight board, and Puerto Rico has mechanisms for
collective creditor action it may rely upon in lieu of the traditional
bankruptcy-like process.154
Puerto Rico had been in crisis for over a decade before Congress
passed PROMESA. Nearly every facet of every level of the island’s

149. See id.
150. Adam J. Levitin, Bankruptcy’s Lorelei: The Dangerous Allure of Financial Institution
Bankruptcy, 97 N.C. L. REV. 243, 249 (2019).
151. See Thomas W. Joo, A Comparison of Liquidation Regimes: Dodd-Frank’s Orderly
Liquidation Authority and the Securities Investor Protection Act, 6 BROOK. J. CORP. FIN. & COM.
L. 47, 65–66 (2011).
152. In addition to Dodd-Frank, Congress has created other special legal regimes to address
the unique circumstances that arise when financial institutions and other industry players fail. See,
e.g., Securities Investor Protection Act of 1970, 15 U.S.C. §§ 78aaa–78lll (protecting investors
when a registered broker or dealer fails); Financial Institutions Reform, Recovery, and
Enforcement Act of 1989, Pub. L. No. 101-73, 103 Stat. 183, 187 (codified in scattered sections
of 12 U.S.C.) (creating the Resolution Trust Corporation to close insolvent thrifts and creating the
Office of Thrift Supervision to regulate savings banks and savings and loans associations in the
wake of the savings and loan crisis).
153. See Lorraine S. McGowen, The Impact of the New Restructuring Law on Puerto Rico
Creditors, HARV. L. SCH. F. ON CORP. GOVERNANCE (Aug. 20, 2016),
https://corpgov.law.harvard.edu/2016/08/20/the-impact-of-the-new-restructuring-law-on-puertorico-creditors/ [https://perma.cc/6JAN-CAWW].
154. See Guadalupe, supra note 12.
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governing structure had some sort of fiscal problem.155 As is typical of
governmental fiscal distress, the contributing factors were numerous,
varied, and at times difficult to pinpoint.156 In Puerto Rico’s case,
everything from local fiscal mismanagement to Wall Street greed157 to
decades of U.S. federal policy158 played a role in the island’s fiscal
turmoil. In part because of the number and variety of Puerto Rico’s
problems, a one-size-fits-all framework such as the Bankruptcy Code was
unlikely to address many, if not most, of these problems.159
In April of 2016, the Puerto Rican government began coming to terms
with the reality that it could not pay its bondholders what they were owed.
At that time, then-Governor Padilla signed an emergency moratorium that
attempted to justify Puerto Rico’s default on a $422 million bond
payment due May 1.160 At the same time, the governor warned that the
island would also default on a second, much larger payment due July 1.161
On the mainland, Congress had been observing Puerto Rico’s descent
into fiscal turmoil but had not yet acted to help. Legislators debated the
merits of intervening in what some viewed as a local crisis that local
mistakes caused.162 The governor’s April 2016 announcement, however,
was a wake-up call, as Congress quickly realized that a failure to act could
trigger a humanitarian crisis as well as a financial one.163
155. See Samuel Issacharoff et al., What is Puerto Rico?, 94 IND. L.J. 1, 32 (2019) (noting
that Puerto Rico’s financial distress was both local and federal in nature); McGowen, supra note
153 (observing that, in addition to the debt the commonwealth itself held, many of Puerto Rico’s
instrumentalities held significant debt); Morales, supra note 4 (describing the varied forms of
Puerto Rico’s debt).
156. See Laura N. Coordes & Thom Reilly, Predictors of Municipal Bankruptcies and State
Intervention Programs: An Exploratory Study, 105 KY. L.J. 493, 503–16 (2017) (discussing and
categorizing numerous contributors to municipal fiscal distress).
157. See Laura Sullivan, How Puerto Rico’s Debt Created a Perfect Storm Before the Storm,
NPR (May 2, 2018, 7:10 AM), https://www.npr.org/2018/05/02/607032585/how-puerto-ricosdebt-created-a-perfect-storm-before-the-storm [https://perma.cc/V584-Q7DT] (“Wall Street kept
pushing the Puerto Rican government’s loans even as the island teetered on default . . . .”).
158. See id. (describing a “special tax break” that brought business to the island but that
Congress phased out beginning in 1996); Nathan Bomey, 6 Reasons Why Puerto Rico Slid into
Financial Crisis, USA TODAY (Oct. 4, 2017, 6:00 PM), https://www.usatoday.com/story/money/
2017/10/04/puerto-rico-debt-crisis-bankruptcy-donald-trump/731091001/ [https://perma.cc/36K
S-A2TR] (noting that because Puerto Rico does not receive as much Medicaid funding as U.S.
states, the island has borrowed money to fund its healthcare system).
159. See Coordes & Reilly, supra note 156, at 547 (“[N]o one-size-fits-all solution for
resolving municipal fiscal crises exists.”).
160. See Morales, supra note 4.
161. See id.
162. See, e.g., Mary Williams Walsh, Here’s Why Puerto Rico’s Next Governor Will Inherit
a Financial Mess, N.Y. TIMES (July 25, 2019), https://www.nytimes.com/2019/07/25/business/
puerto-rico-governor-restructuring.html [https://perma.cc/KAK5-MU99] (describing the local
government’s “bad fiscal habits”).
163. See Morales, supra note 4.
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As a result, Congress was more or less forced to act because Puerto
Rico lacked access to bankruptcy relief. In 2014, the commonwealth
attempted to address its financial situation by enacting the Puerto Rico
Corporation Debt Enforcement and Recovery Act (Recovery Act).164 The
Recovery Act created a bankruptcy-like debt resolution process for
Puerto Rico’s territorial instrumentalities.165 Investment funds,
concerned about receiving cents on the dollar for their investments,
immediately sued the commonwealth, claiming that the Recovery Act
was unlawful.166 Specifically, the funds argued that the Bankruptcy Code
prohibited Puerto Rico from implementing its own debt relief scheme.167
The case, Puerto Rico v. Franklin California Tax-Free Trust,168
ultimately went before the U.S. Supreme Court. In a 5–2 decision,169 the
Court agreed with the funds, holding that the Bankruptcy Code
preempted the Recovery Act even as it prohibited Puerto Rico from
authorizing its instrumentalities to use the Code.170 Thus, Puerto Rico
could neither use the Bankruptcy Code nor design its own debt relief.
Perhaps recognizing that it was leaving Puerto Rico in a difficult position,
the Court dropped a hint to Congress in dicta, observing that Puerto Rico
was not “by definition” excluded from Chapter 9 of the Bankruptcy Code
and indicating that Congress could amend the Code to allow Puerto
Rico’s instrumentalities to use it.171
The Court’s decision in Franklin effectively thrust the matter back
into Congress’s hands. However, although Puerto Rico was in obviously
dire financial straits, the island’s relationship with the mainland United
States was on rocky ground. The local government had repeatedly failed
to respond to Congress’s calls for greater transparency with respect to its
finances.172 Legislators on the mainland were frustrated by what they
164. 2014 P.R. Laws 371, 371; see also Puerto Rico v. Franklin Cal. Tax-Free Tr., 136 S. Ct.
1938, 1942–43 (2016) (describing the Act and the events leading to its passage).
165. See Franklin, 136 S. Ct. at 1943.
166. See id.
167. Id.; see 11 U.S.C. § 903.
168. 136 S. Ct. 1938 (2016).
169. Justice Scalia had died and not yet been replaced. See Greg Stohr & Michelle Kaske,
Scalia, Alito Court Absences Shape Puerto Rico Debt-Relief Bid, BLOOMBERG L. (Mar. 21, 2016,
12:20 PM), https://news.bloomberglaw.com/business-and-practice/scalia-alito-court-absencesshape-puerto-rico-debt-relief-bid [https://perma.cc/Y4N8-RQ5U]. Justice Alito recused himself
from the case. Adam Liptak & Mary Williams Walsh, Supreme Court Rejects Puerto Rico Law
in Debt Restructuring Case, N.Y. TIMES (June 13, 2016), https://www.nytimes.com/2016/06/
14/us/politics/supreme-court-rules-against-puerto-rico-in-debt-restructuring-case.html [https://
perma.cc/5M9C-58Y8].
170. See Franklin, 136 S. Ct. at 1942.
171. Id. at 1948 (quoting Brief for Petitioner Commonwealth of Puerto Rico et al. at 25,
Franklin, 136 S. Ct. 1938 (No. 15-233)).
172. See Morales, supra note 4. Recent events, namely a corruption scandal, have done
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considered the island’s lack of cooperation and good faith.173 In addition,
some members of Congress were wary of any law that could be perceived
as a bailout of the island and its irresponsible local government.174
Thus, when Congress ultimately drafted PROMESA, it took care to
differentiate the law from a bailout or bankruptcy. In this way, Congress
was able to get more support for the bill to quickly enact it into law.175
Although the need for PROMESA—or some response to Puerto Rico’s
fiscal distress—had been evident for years, PROMESA was still a “lastminute compromise”176 that arose out of a desperate need to act.177 By
avoiding the terms “bankruptcy” and “bailout,” Congress assuaged fears
that PROMESA was a step toward bankruptcy (or bailout) for U.S.
states.178 PROMESA’s wording enabled Congress to provide a path for
fiscal relief for Puerto Rico while avoiding potentially drawn-out fights
over politically charged terminology.179
nothing to boost Congress’s confidence in Puerto Rico. See Karen Pierog, Puerto Rico Faces
Tougher Scrutiny over Federal Medicaid Funding, REUTERS (July 17, 2019, 5:49 PM),
https://www.reuters.com/article/us-usa-puertorico-congress/puerto-rico-faces-tougher-scrutinyover-federal-medicaid-funding-idUSKCN1UC2PI [https://perma.cc/9XU5-GSH7] (noting that,
in the wake of the corruption scandal, federal lawmakers called for heightened scrutiny of Puerto
Rico’s Medicaid program).
173. See Michael Moran, The Plot Against Puerto Rico, FOREIGN POL’Y (Apr. 29, 2016, 6:18
PM), https://foreignpolicy.com/2016/04/29/puerto-rico-debt-default-lew-ryan-obama/ [https://
perma.cc/KW8Z-N3TZ] (observing how many members of Congress treated Puerto Rico’s
distress as “a mere annoyance” and positing that “all sides condemn Puerto Rico’s poor record of
financial governance”).
174. Veronique de Rugy, Is Congress Going To Bailout Puerto Rico?, NAT’L REV. (Apr.
28, 2017, 6:54 PM), https://www.nationalreview.com/corner/puerto-rico-bailout-congress-usterritory/ [https://perma.cc/8DCD-5VC9] (“Republicans in Congress have been pretty
consistently and rightfully opposed to bailing out the island.”).
175. See Hadžiomerović , supra note 26, at 1277 (arguing that PROMESA was “one of the
only plausible courses of action available at the time because the political climate did not allow
for a Code amendment”).
176. Cheryl D. Block, Federal Policy for Financially-Distressed Subnational Governments:
The U.S. States and Puerto Rico, 53 WASH. U. J.L. & POL’Y 215, 227 (2017) (discussing
Congress’s reasons and objectives for passing PROMESA).
177. See Tina Meng, Note, The Perfect Storm: Puerto Rico’s Evolving Debt Crises Under
PROMESA, 2019 COLUM. BUS. L. REV. 367, 382 (“After the Supreme Court’s ruling in
Franklin . . ., Puerto Rico was back where it had started—the territory was still buried under
billions of dollars in unpayable debt but had no viable path towards solvency.”). In this respect,
at least, PROMESA is typical: last-minute responses are common in bankruptcy law, particularly
in municipal bankruptcy, which PROMESA closely resembles. See, e.g., Coordes, supra note 39,
at 1228.
178. Skeel, supra note 67, at 873 (discussing the context and provisions of Title III of
PROMESA); see 162 CONG. REC. S2,000–01 (daily ed. Apr. 13, 2016) (statement of Sen. John
Cornyn) (discussing how “taking advantage of bankruptcy law” is not equivalent to receiving a
“bailout”).
179. David Skeel, Essay, Notes from the Puerto Rico Oversight (Not Control) Board 34th
Pileggi Lecture, 43 DEL. J. CORP. L. 529, 535 (2019) (“Congress went to great lengths to avoid
calling [Title III of PROMESA] bankruptcy.”).
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Congress passed PROMESA on June 30, 2016, one day before the
Puerto Rican government’s threatened July 1 default.180 With
PROMESA’s passage, Congress enacted relief for Puerto Rico that came
not from the Bankruptcy Code itself but from independent, bespoke
legislation designed uniquely for Puerto Rico and its instrumentalities.
Indeed, although PROMESA contains many of the hallmarks of
bankruptcy law, it is more than bankruptcy. The law blends the traditional
bankruptcy process with oversight mechanisms used for major U.S.
cities, as well as sovereign debt restructuring techniques.181 This
combination provided Puerto Rico with access to more restructuring
options than a debtor would receive under the Bankruptcy Code. Indeed,
the Code was not designed to comprehensively address territory-level
debts.182 At the same time, however, the island faced significantly more
challenges and restrictions than a typical Bankruptcy Code debtor.
PROMESA consists of three primary components. The first, Title III,
is based on Chapter 9 of the Bankruptcy Code.183 Title III allows for a
court-supervised debt restructuring, similar to the process under the
Bankruptcy Code.184 Both Title III and Chapter 9 bankruptcy impose an
automatic stay during the restructuring, which prevents creditors from
taking actions to collect money owed by debtors and gives the debtor
much-needed breathing space to negotiate with its creditors and devise a
debt adjustment plan.185
Although Chapter 9 and Title III are largely similar, several
differences stand out. First, PROMESA’s oversight board, rather than the
debtor, has the exclusive authority to file and submit a plan of debt
adjustment.186 In addition, a district judge rather than a bankruptcy judge
180. See Puerto Rico Oversight, Management, and Economic Stability Act (PROMESA),
Pub. L. No. 114-187, 130 Stat. 549, 549 (2016) (codified at 48 U.S.C. §§ 2101–2241).
181. See Skeel, supra note 67, at 864.
182. See Pottow, supra note 3, at 700 (noting that Puerto Rico’s territorial debt “would be
exempt even if Chapter 9 applied”); see also Nathan A. Mooney, Note, Dealing With an Inevitable
Case of “I Told-You-So”: Crafting a Framework for Resolving State Fiscal Distress Post-Puerto
Rico, 15 N.Y.U. J.L. & BUS. 653, 670 (2019) (noting that Chapter 9 was “at best an imperfect
solution” for Puerto Rico and its instrumentalities because (1) there was no process to adjust the
debt the island’s central government issued; and (2) there was a dispute over whether special
revenue bonds the island’s public utilities issued were protected from adjustment in bankruptcy).
183. See Bruce A. Wilson, PROMESA: A Summary of the Puerto Rico Oversight Legislation,
KUTAK ROCK LLP (Sept. 7, 2016), http://www.kutakrock.com/PROMESA-Puerto-RicoOversight-Economic-Stability-Act/ [https://perma.cc/GP7R-JL2B].
184. See id.
185. See id.
186. Id. Despite these limitations, some view PROMESA as more debtor-friendly than
Chapter 9. See Issacharoff et al., supra note 155, at 32 (“Overall, PROMESA has more protections
for Puerto Rico during a bankruptcy than Puerto Rico would have obtained if its subordinate
jurisdictions were allowed to file for bankruptcy protection under Chapter 9 of the Bankruptcy
Code.”).
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oversees Puerto Rico’s restructuring.187 Despite the differences between
Title III and Code-based bankruptcy, Title III does contain the traditional
bankruptcy toolkit: it gives the debtor the ability to bind holdouts, for
example, and imposes an automatic stay.188
At least on paper, PROMESA’s oversight board—its second key
component—has broad authority: it can approve fiscal plans and budgets,
oversee operations, implement any changes necessary to comply with
approved fiscal plans and budgets, approve debt issuances, hold hearings,
issue subpoenas, enter into contracts, analyze pensions, approve
voluntary settlements, and become a direct party in litigation against
Puerto Rico or its instrumentalities.189 In addition, any budget the island’s
local government passes must be consistent with a board-approved fiscal
plan.190 Since the board’s creation, scholars have debated whether it
possesses too much power or not enough.191 Others have described the
board’s existence—as well as PROMESA as a whole—as paternalistic.192
Like Title III, the oversight board is based on other debt relief
mechanisms. Specifically, the board is primarily modeled on the financial
control board that took over Washington, D.C.’s finances in the 1990s.193
PROMESA’s third main component is Title VI, which provides for
collective creditor action to modify bond terms.194 Specifically, Title VI
allows bond terms to be modified without 100% bondholder consent.195
This component of PROMESA draws from sovereign debt restructuring
practices.196 The oversight board administers all Title VI proceedings.197
187. See Melissa B. Jacoby, Presiding Over Municipal Bankruptcies: Then, Now, and Puerto
Rico, 91 AM. BANKR. L.J. 375, 375–76 (2017).
188. See Mooney, supra note 182, at 673.
189. Wilson, supra note 183.
190. Id.
191. See, e.g., Victoria Zorovich, Note, The Perfect Storm: Weathering Puerto Rico’s Fiscal
Crisis in the Wake of Hurricane Maria, 46 HOFSTRA L. REV. 1067, 1088 (2018) (arguing that
Congress should give the oversight board more authority over the island’s fiscal management and
humanitarian relief efforts); Skeel, supra note 67, at 873–74 (cataloguing the board’s powers and
noting that they must be consistent with debt restructuring purposes); Walsh, supra note 162 (“A
series of recent corruption scandals has prompted at least some members of Congress to ask
whether the board’s powers should be expanded.”).
192. See, e.g., Issacharoff et al., supra note 155, at 33 (“However beneficial PROMESA may
turn out to be, it is still a paternalistic intervention imposed from without.”).
193. See Skeel, supra note 67, at 865 (“The Washington D.C. oversight board is especially
relevant to Puerto Rico, because both boards were created by Congress and because the
Washington D.C. legislation served as the template for Puerto Rico’s oversight board.”). The New
York Emergency Financial Control Board was another important influence. See id. at 864–65
(calling New York City’s financial crisis the “watershed moment for oversight boards”).
194. See Wilson, supra note 183.
195. See id.
196. See Skeel, supra note 67, at 872 (“Title VI . . . is similar to the collective action
provisions that are used to restructure sovereign debt.”).
197. Id. at 873.
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Title VI has been used only sparingly in Puerto Rico’s fiscal recovery
process.198 In contrast, the board has filed five Title III proceedings,
several of which contain numerous adversary proceedings.199
Apart from its three primary components, PROMESA contains
several provisions specific to Puerto Rico. These include provisions for
infrastructure revitalization and provisions lowering the minimum wage
of certain workers.200 While each primary component of PROMESA has
precedent in other areas of restructuring law and practice, PROMESA
uniquely combines these components, creating bespoke bankruptcy relief
for Puerto Rico and its instrumentalities.201
Puerto Rico easily qualifies as a bankruptcy misfit. It was in dire
financial straits yet had no legal mechanism to adjust its debts. As a
governmental unit, it could not shut down or liquidate assets,202 but it
needed to break away from some of its contractual obligations and
receive a discharge in order to continue functioning. At the same time,
the Bankruptcy Code could not provide the island with the debt relief it
so desperately needed without significant revisions. Not only was the
Code not designed to address territorial debt, but scholars and
policymakers were also deeply divided over which of the island’s many
other debts bankruptcy could restructure.203 The political overlay—years
of fiscal irresponsibility, a tumultuous relationship with the mainland
United States, and decades of mutual mistrust—only made a Bankruptcy
Code amendment less likely.204 All of these factors led Congress to
choose bespoke bankruptcy for Puerto Rico.205

198. See id. at 876 (noting that, although the board considered using Title VI for the Puerto
Rico Electric Power Authority (PREPA), it ultimately chose to address PREPA’s issues using
Title III); Skeel, supra note 179, at 540 (describing the Government Development Bank’s
voluntary restructuring under Title VI).
199. See Eva Lloréns Vélez, Fee Examiner in Puerto Rico Debt Restructuring Warns of
Rising Litigation Costs, CARIBBEAN BUS. (June 7, 2019), https://caribbeanbusiness.com/feeexaminer-in-puerto-rico-debt-restructuring-warns-of-rising-litigation-costs/
[https://perma.cc/
VZV6-SBK6].
200. See Wilson, supra note 183.
201. See id.
202. See Frank Shafroth, Seeking Shelter from a Quake, GMU MUN. SUSTAINABILITY
PROJECT (Jan. 7, 2020), https://fiscalbankruptcy.wordpress.com/2020/01/07/seeking-shelterfrom-a-quake/ [https://perma.cc/7Z59-4UN7] (observing that “shut down” is not an option for
local or state governments).
203. See Mooney, supra note 182, at 670.
204. See Tom C.W. Lin, Americans, Almost and Forgotten, 107 CALIF. L. REV. 1249, 1253–
56 (2019) (observing that territories are differently situated from other U.S. political entities and
that Americans living in the territories are treated differently from those living on the mainland).
205. Fin. Oversight & Mgmt. Bd. for P.R. v. Aurelius Inv., LLC, 140 S. Ct. 1649, 1655
(2020) (“PROMESA allows Puerto Rico and its entities to file for federal bankruptcy
protection.”).
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B. Future Reforms
Many, if not most, of the major debates over the future of bankruptcy
law are about whether or how to amend the Bankruptcy Code. Should
Congress amend the Code to better address the needs of some debtors that
already use it, as it recently did for small businesses? Should Congress
add chapters or subchapters to better accommodate some entities—or
simply to include other entities that have been previously excluded?
Among proposals for additional chapters of the Bankruptcy Code, the
one that has seemingly gained the most traction is a proposal for a new
Chapter 14, which would provide debt relief to some financial
institutions, including bank holding companies.206 Although bank
holding companies are currently eligible for Chapter 11 relief, in practice,
bank holding company bankruptcy presents complications concerning
how closely the holding company is related to the bank itself.207 A bill
proposed in the Senate in 2018 aimed to complement and assist the
process outlined in Dodd-Frank by providing for the
“rapid . . . recapitalization of a failed financial institution.”208
One of the primary justifications for a new Chapter 14 is that it could
help SIFIs from collapsing without the need to resort to a bailout.209
Although Dodd-Frank encourages bank holding companies to use the
Bankruptcy Code, “critical resolution tools . . . currently are unavailable
or not obviously available under the Bankruptcy Code.”210 The latest bill,
the Taxpayer Protection and Responsible Resolution Act, would create
“a process akin to Chapter 11 . . . but specifically for failing major
banks.”211 In brief, it would provide a “single point of entry” approach,
allowing the failing financial firm to quickly separate its “good” and
“bad” assets while retaining key Chapter 11 protections, including the
absolute priority rule and continuity of management of the bank.212 Such
amalgamation of bankruptcy and nonbankruptcy (i.e., single point of

206. See Senate Judiciary Committee Hearing on Bankruptcy for Banks and Proposed
Chapter 14, HARV. L. SCH. BANKR. ROUNDTABLE (Dec. 4, 2018), https://blogs.harvard.edu/
bankruptcyroundtable/tag/chapter-14/ [https://perma.cc/KR4Y-2NRP].
207. See WARREN ET AL., supra note 42, at 832 (discussing the “cat-and-mouse game”
Congress plays with the financial industry and gaps in the FDIC resolution system).
208. Big Bank Bankruptcy: 10 Years After Lehman Brothers: Hearing Before the S. Comm.
on the Judiciary, 115th Cong. 1 (2018) (statement of Mark J. Roe, Professor of Law, Harvard
Law School) (emphasis omitted).
209. See id. (statement of Donald S. Bernstein, Partner, Davis Polk & Wardwell LLP).
210. Id. at 8 (statement of Stephen E. Hessler, Partner, Kirkland & Ellis LLP).
211. Id.
212. Id. at 4–7.
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entry) techniques may work better than either bankruptcy or a single point
of entry strategy standing alone.213
Another attention-grabbing proposal to modify the Bankruptcy Code
is for the creation of a Code chapter that U.S. states could use to file for
bankruptcy. Although there is extensive debate in the academic literature
over whether states could or should have access to bankruptcy relief, 214
it is clear that state bankruptcy relief is not available under an existing
chapter of the Bankruptcy Code and could not be made available without
substantial modifications.215 As states face increasing amounts of debt,
discussions of bankruptcy tools for them may become more practical and
less theoretical.216
Just as there have been proposals to create new chapters of the
Bankruptcy Code, scholars have also proposed the creation of new
subchapters. For example, Professor Bruce Markell has proposed
creating a subchapter for individual Chapter 11 debtors.217 In previous
work, I have advocated for the creation of subchapters to address the
needs of healthcare debtors.218 Both of these proposals tout the use of
subchapters as structural mechanisms that both emphasize and
consolidate the different treatment the Bankruptcy Code already provides
for these debtors.219
Finally, there have been some infrequent proposals for bespoke
bankruptcy laws. For instance, I have previously advocated for Congress
to adopt a bespoke bankruptcy law for tribal corporations, arguing that
they are fundamentally different from other business debtors, due to
unique concerns about tribal sovereignty, among other things.220
213. See David A. Skeel Jr., Single Point of Entry and the Bankruptcy Alternative, in ACROSS
DIVIDE: NEW PERSPECTIVES ON THE FINANCIAL CRISIS 311, 314 (Martin Neil Baily &
John B. Taylor eds., 2014).
214. See, e.g., Steven L. Schwarcz, A Minimalist Approach to State “Bankruptcy,” 59 UCLA
L. REV. 322, 331–32 (2011) (proposing a “minimalist legal framework” that incorporates some
bankruptcy protections for fiscally distressed states). For an excellent analysis of the pros and
cons of state bankruptcy, see generally David A. Skeel Jr., States of Bankruptcy, 79 U. CHI. L.
REV. 677, 680, 683–84 (2012).
215. See Mooney, supra note 182, at 707 (proposing a PROMESA-like process for states).
216. Cf., e.g., Brian Chappatta, Ripples from Puerto Rico’s Debt Crisis Reach the Mainland,
BNN BLOOMBERG (July 2, 2019), https://www.bnnbloomberg.ca/ripples-from-puerto-rico-s-debtcrisis-reach-the-mainland-1.1281398 [https://perma.cc/RB67-PB94] (discussing a lawsuit
seeking to invalidate $14 billion in Illinois bonds that was inspired by Puerto Rico’s restructuring
under PROMESA).
217. Bruce A. Markell, The Sub Rosa Subchapter: Individual Debtors in Chapter 11 After
BAPCPA, 2007 U. ILL. L. REV. 67, 73 (2007).
218. Coordes, supra note 27, at 465–66.
219. See Markell, supra note 217, at 70 (arguing that Congress could better achieve its
desired changes for individual Chapter 11 debtors by creating “a separate subchapter”); Coordes,
supra note 27, at 466 (discussing the benefits of subchapters for healthcare debtors).
220. See Coordes, supra note 85, at 365–67.
THE GREAT
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Furthermore, despite Congress’s efforts to the contrary, it is possible that
PROMESA may function as a template for a bespoke state bankruptcy
law in the future.221
Most notably, perhaps, legislators in Congress continue to advocate
for even more specialized debt relief for Puerto Rico. In July of 2018,
Senator Warren introduced the U.S. Territorial Relief Act.222 Under Title
I of the proposed Act, U.S. territories would have the option to terminate
their unsecured debts upon meeting specified conditions.223 While Title I
would apply to all territories, Title II would apply uniquely to Puerto
Rico, creating the Puerto Rico Debt Restructuring Compensation Fund to
provide federal funds to compensate some creditors whose debt was
terminated under Title I.224 Finally, Title III of the Act would create an
audit committee to specifically study Puerto Rico’s debt.225 In support of
the Act, Senator Warren described how the hurricanes that have struck
Puerto Rico make special debt relief for the territory necessary.226
Although the Act has not become law, it is further recognition of the need
for expanded bespoke bankruptcy relief, in this case for an entity that
already uses a bespoke framework.227
Over the years, Congress has adjusted bankruptcy law to
accommodate bankruptcy misfits by either amending the Bankruptcy
Code or creating bespoke bankruptcy relief. In the current debates over
access to bankruptcy law, a discussion about using bespoke bankruptcy
has largely taken a back seat to proposals for Code amendments. Of
course, there are many times when amending the Bankruptcy Code may
be preferable to creating a new bankruptcy law from whole cloth. But
sometimes, particularly when substantial deviation from the Code’s
templates is required, it may be better for Congress to experiment with
221. See Mooney, supra note 182, at 707. But see MICHAEL CEMBALEST, EYE ON THE
MARKET 3 (2020), https://am.jpmorgan.com/content/dam/jpm-am-aem/global/en/insights/eyeon-the-market/EOTM_05-04-2020.pdf [https://perma.cc/3B8R-WPFH] (arguing for states to
have access to Chapter 9 provisions in emergencies).
222. U.S. Territorial Relief Act of 2018, S. 3262, 115th Cong. (2018).
223. See id. § 101.
224. See id. §§ 201, 205.
225. See id. § 304. The Act was reintroduced the following year as the U.S. Territorial Relief
Act of 2019. S. 1312, 116th Cong. (2019).
226. U.S. Territorial Relief Act of 2018, ELIZABETH WARREN (May 2, 2019),
https://www.warren.senate.gov/imo/media/doc/U.S.%20Territorial%20Relief%20Act%20Sum
mary%20Final%207.24.18.pdf [https://perma.cc/X9PD-JHMD].
227. See Jim Wyss, House Democrats Seek to Overhaul Puerto Rico Financial Oversight,
BLOOMBERG (May 22, 2020, 7:45 PM), https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2020-0522/house-democrats-seek-to-overhaul-puerto-rico-financial-oversight [https://perma.cc/W5KXD9HA] (discussing proposal for additional bespoke relief for Puerto Rico by House Democrats to
amend PROMESA to define some spending as essential public services, guarantee funding for
the University of Puerto Rico, and require the federal government to finance the operations of the
oversight board).
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new legislation rather than force a square peg into a round hole. In these
cases, bespoke bankruptcy may be the better answer. The next Part takes
up the question of when and how legislators might best use bespoke
bankruptcy to assist with resolving the bankruptcy misfit problem.
III. BESPOKE BANKRUPTCY
Bespoke bankruptcy can be invaluable to bankruptcy misfits like
Puerto Rico. However, it must be used sparingly and cautiously. This Part
describes potential problems with overuse of bespoke bankruptcy and
unveils a method to identify debtors in need of—and well-suited to—
bespoke relief.
A. Overuse Concerns
Bespoke bankruptcy can perform a gap-filling function, providing
debt relief options to entities that might genuinely need bankruptcy tools
but that either cannot or should not use the Bankruptcy Code. As
PROMESA illustrates, bespoke bankruptcy can also provide relief when
amending the Bankruptcy Code is either impractical or politically
infeasible. Yet, bespoke bankruptcy also comes with distinct drawbacks:
it can create uncertainty, it may be difficult to implement, and it can be
costly.228 Creditors may resist implementation of a bespoke framework,
particularly one that alters expected priorities.229 This could lead to
increased borrowing costs for debtors ex ante, in addition to substantial
litigation costs once a debtor is in bankruptcy.
By its very nature, bespoke bankruptcy is experimental. It can involve
the creation of new elements or processes, or a combination of tools that
has never been tried before. This experimentation can undermine parties’
expectations and risks favoring one party over another. It also naturally
creates uncertainty. Notably, uncertainty has characterized much of the
process with PROMESA. In February of 2019, the U.S. Court of Appeals
for the First Circuit determined that the appointment of the oversight
board’s members violated the Constitution’s Appointments Clause
because the board’s members were never confirmed by the Senate.230
228. See Vélez, supra note 199 (“The professional fee burden on the Commonwealth
increases dramatically as litigation proliferates.”).
229. A salient example of creditor resistance to bespoke bankruptcy is Aurelius Capital
Management, which has led a substantial litigation effort against PROMESA. For a detailed
account of this saga, see Jesse Barron, The Curious Case of Aurelius Capital v. Puerto Rico, N.Y.
TIMES MAG. (Nov. 26, 2019), https://www.nytimes.com/2019/11/26/magazine/aurelius-capital-vpuerto-rico.html [https://perma.cc/LJ3D-6L77].
230. See Melissa Jacoby, PROMESA Heads to the U.S. Supreme Court?, CREDIT SLIPS
(June 24, 2019, 12:12 PM), https://www.creditslips.org/creditslips/2019/06/promesa-heads-tothe-supreme-court.html?utm_source=feedburner&utm_medium=email&utm_campaign=Feed%
3A +creditslips%2Ffeed+%28Credit+Slips%29 [https://perma.cc/7GGX-ZGKJ].
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Although the Supreme Court ultimately determined that the board’s
appointment was valid,231 the possibility that the board could be deemed
unconstitutional and dismantled at any moment threatened to disrupt the
board’s entire restructuring process and years of work.232
Although the Supreme Court upheld the oversight board’s
appointment, bondholders have found other ways to challenge other
aspects of PROMESA. In June 2019, the First Circuit told a group of
bondholders that they could not challenge PROMESA’s constitutionality
in the PROMESA proceedings themselves.233 The court found that two
provisions in PROMESA stripped the district court of its jurisdiction to
grant the relief sought (a declaration and injunction to restore the flow of
revenue to the bondholders) by the bondholders’ guarantor.234 In
numerous other decisions, the district court and the First Circuit have
rebuffed attempts by other bondholders to short-circuit the PROMESA
process.235 Still, these lawsuits and others have crippled Puerto Rico’s
efforts to move forward with a debt restructuring.236
Even putting aside the legal challenges, the scope of the oversight
board’s authority is regularly questioned, debated, and threatened. As a
231. See Fin. Oversight and Mgmt. Bd. for P.R. v. Aurelius Inv., LLC, 140 S. Ct. 1649, 1655
(2020).
232. See Lawrence Hurley, U.S. Top Court Takes on Puerto Rico Financial Oversight Board
Dispute, REUTERS (June 20, 2019, 1:50 PM), https://www.reuters.com/article/us-usa-court-puerto
rico/u-s-top-court-takes-on-puerto-rico-financial-oversight-board-dispute-idUSKCN1TL2DJ
[https://perma.cc/7F8B-KHXJ].
233. See In re Fin. Oversight and Mgmt. Bd. for P.R., 927 F.3d 597, 601–03, 605 (1st Cir.
2019), cert. denied, 140 S. Ct. 856 (2020).
234. See id. at 601–03.
235. See, e.g., Bill Rochelle, First Circuit Nixes Another Attempt at Unraveling Puerto
Rico’s Debt Arrangement, ROCHELLE’S DAILY WIRE (June 26, 2019), https://www.abi.org/
newsroom/daily-wire/first-circuit-nixes-another-attempt-at-unraveling-puerto-rico%E2%80%99
s-debt-arrangement [https://perma.cc/L92S-NRZB] [hereinafter Rochelle, First Circuit]. In
January of 2020, the Supreme Court denied certiorari from a First Circuit decision “holding that
bondholders cannot compel payment during the course of restructuring proceedings and before
confirmation of a plan.” Bill Rochelle, Supreme Court Won’t Hear a Case to Compel Paying
Puerto Rico Bondholders Currently, ROCHELLE’S DAILY WIRE (Jan. 13, 2020),
https://www.abi.org/newsroom/daily-wire/supreme-court-won%E2%80%99t-hear-a-case-tocompel-paying-puerto-rico-bondholders [https://perma.cc/X249-BMVU].
236. See Steven Church, Puerto Rico Judge Imposes 120-Day Pause on Bankruptcy Suits,
BLOOMBERG (July 24, 2019, 11:55 AM), https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2019-07-24/
puerto-rico-judge-imposes-120-day-pause-on-bankruptcy-suits#:~:text=As%20political%20cha
os%20swirled%20outside,to%20the%20island's%20financial%20turmoil.&text=Under%20Swa
in's%20order%2C%20the%20court,be%20suspended%20for%20120%20days [https://perma.cc
/JLM3-GG3G]; Maria Chutchian, Puerto Rico Oversight Board Gears Up for Latest Challenge
to Debt Restructuring, REUTERS (Jan. 6, 2021. 6:16 PM), https://www.reuters.com/article/
bankruptcy-puerto-rico/puerto-rico-oversight-board-gears-up-for-latest-challenge-to-debt-restru
cturing-idUSL1N2JH34Q [https://perma.cc/RUL6-9MME] (discussing a challenge from Ambac
Assurance Corporation that claims that PROMESA violates the uniformity requirement in the
Constitution).
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result, there is often little certainty about who is in charge of what on the
island. For example, Puerto Rico’s former governor, Ricardo Rosselló,
frequently challenged the oversight board and sought to curb its authority.
In July of 2018, Governor Rosselló sued the board, claiming that it had
“usurped his power and authority.”237 The following year, the oversight
board rejected Governor Rosselló’s spending plan and sought to impose
its own budget on the territory.238 Governor Rosselló and the board were
in near-constant dispute over who had the right to enact spending plans
and the extent to which each party could veto the other’s decisions.239
The Governor’s challenges were echoed by the Puerto Rican public.
Protesters filled the streets outside the board’s meeting places, claiming
that the board represented a lack of democratic self-governance.240
Governor Rosselló’s departure in the summer of 2019 created more
uncertainty for Puerto Rico; indeed, the protesters who demanded
Rosselló’s resignation also fought the board’s continued presence on the
island.241 Many Puerto Rican legislators vehemently opposed Rosselló’s
designated successor, Pedro Pierluisi, because of his connections to and
work with the oversight board.242
From a legal standpoint, the board’s authority over certain aspects of
Puerto Rican governance remains unclear. District Judge Laura Taylor
Swain, who is overseeing Puerto Rico’s Title III proceedings, has
indicated that the board’s actions should have some basis in the fiscal
plan—but her opinion has left the board with some leeway to interpret
the meaning of “some basis.”243 Furthermore, as Judge Swain herself
237. Frank Shafroth, The Fiscal Challenges of Federalism, GMU MUN. SUSTAINABILITY
PROJECT (July 13, 2018), https://fiscalbankruptcy.wordpress.com/2018/07/13/the-fiscalchallenges-of-federalism/ [https://perma.cc/A79N-JAF2].
238. See Michelle Kaske, Puerto Rico Board to Impose Cuts in Fight with Governor (1),
BLOOMBERG L. (May 28, 2019, 5:55 PM), https://news.bloomberglaw.com/bankruptcylaw/puerto-rico-board-to-impose-cuts-in-fight-with-governor-1 [https://perma.cc/P5NX-ZSL4];
Michael Deibert, Puerto Rico Fiscal Board Seeks Deeper Budget Cuts than Governor,
BLOOMBERG L. (July 1, 2019, 3:25 PM), https://news.bloomberglaw.com/bankruptcy-law/puertorico-fiscal-board-seeks-deeper-budget-cuts-than-governor [https://perma.cc/3DHC-UF9P].
239. See Walsh, supra note 162 (“Mr. Rosselló and the board have long been at odds.”).
240. See Edwin Melendez, Is Congress’ Plan to Save Puerto Rico Working?, CONVERSATION
(July 31, 2017, 5:30 PM), https://theconversation.com/is-congress-plan-to-save-puerto-ricoworking-80785 [https://perma.cc/3GLC-W2QV].
241. See Michael Deibert et al., Puerto Rico Governor’s Resignation Shakes Bankrupt
Commonwealth, BLOOMBERG L. (July 25, 2019, 6:09 AM), https://news.bloomberglaw.com/
bankruptcy-law/puerto-rico-governors-resignation-shakes-bankrupt-commonwealth [https://
perma.cc/4LV9-4M62].
242. Michelle Kaske & Michael Diebert, Puerto Rico’s Governor Is Going. Who Comes Next
Is Less Certain, BNN BLOOMBERG (Aug. 2, 2019), https://www.bnnbloomberg.ca/puerto-rico-sgovernor-is-going-who-comes-next-is-less-certain-1.1296288 [https://perma.cc/R9AZ-GE3X].
243. See Skeel, supra note 67, at 878 (discussing Judge Swain’s decision, which
“emphasized that the Board’s powers are not unlimited” and “admonished the Board and the
government to work together”).
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acknowledged, PROMESA created a “power-sharing structure that
allows for mutual sabotage.”244 “The unsettled question of the board’s
power has been a defining theme of the island’s attempts to end its fiscal
crisis.”245 Without a clear understanding of the extent and scope of the
oversight board’s power, everything the board does is subject to legal
challenge and possible reversal. Notably, even as the Supreme Court
recognized that the board had been properly appointed, Justice Sonia
Sotomayor surmised in her concurrence that the board and its actions may
still be illegitimate.246
Puerto Rico’s future is still uncertain, and its experience with
PROMESA illustrates that Congress’s choice to provide bespoke relief
can create significant problems. Because bespoke bankruptcy is, by its
very nature, novel and experimental, norms and rules that typically apply
in Code-based bankruptcy settings may not transfer to bespoke
bankruptcy. The resulting uncertainty surrounding bespoke bankruptcy’s
application can encourage legal challenges, political posturing, and even
protests.
More broadly, widespread use of bespoke bankruptcy could turn
bankruptcy into a law of exceptions, possibly threatening the coherence
of U.S. bankruptcy law. If bankruptcy law becomes more fragmented,
there will be fewer opportunities for parties to establish norms and
practices with respect to particular bankruptcy processes, with the result
that parties could simply revert to the familiarity of Code-based
bankruptcy even if a bespoke option is present.
A related concern is surfacing with respect to the treatment of the
University of Puerto Rico’s debt under PROMESA. It is unclear whether
a debt restructuring or the austerity measures taken by the oversight board
would constitute a “bankruptcy” for purposes of Title IV of the Higher
Education Act of 1965.247 If it does, the University of Puerto Rico would
244. Steven Church, Puerto Rico Asks Judge to Force Federal Board to Share Its Power,
BLOOMBERG L. (July 25, 2018, 5:46 PM), https://news.bloomberglaw.com/bankruptcylaw/puerto-rico-asks-judge-to-force-federal-board-to-share-its-power [https://perma.cc/K2NN3WLD].
245. Id.
246. See Fin. Oversight & Mgmt. Bd. for P.R. v. Aurelius Inv., LLC, 140 S. Ct. 1649, 1683
(2020) (Sotomayor, J., concurring) (“These cases raise serious questions about when, if ever, the
Federal Government may constitutionally exercise authority to establish territorial officers in a
Territory like Puerto Rico, where Congress seemingly ceded that authority long ago to Puerto
Rico itself.”).
247. Pub. L. No. 89-329, 79 Stat. 1219 (codified as amended at 20 U.S.C. §§ 1001 to
1161aa–1); The Status of the Puerto Rico Oversight, Management, and Economic Stability Act
(PROMESA): Lessons Learned Three Years Later: Hearing Before the H. Comm. on Nat. Res.,
116th Cong. 82, 85–86 (2019) (statement of Dr. Ana Cristina Gómez-Pérez, Associate Professor,
Univ. of P.R.) (quoting Scott F. Norberg, Bankruptcy and Higher Education Institutions, 23 AM.
BANKR. INST. L. REV. 385, 385 (2015)) [hereinafter The Status of PROMESA].
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be ineligible for federal funding.248 Put differently, bespoke bankruptcy
runs the risk of making the concept of “bankruptcy” itself unstable, which
in turn affects nonbankruptcy law. For this reason, this Article has taken
care to separate the concept of “bankruptcy” from the Bankruptcy Code;
however, in practice, there may be good reason to view the Bankruptcy
Code as synonymous with “bankruptcy” law more generally.249
In addition, because bankruptcy is federal in nature; widespread use
of bespoke bankruptcy, particularly in those situations where bankruptcy
relief has previously been unavailable, may be seen as federal
government overreach. In Puerto Rico’s case, this concern has surfaced
as part of the local population’s distrust and resentment of the oversight
board and the policies it is enacting, which have directly affected Puerto
Ricans’ daily lives.250
In other cases, bespoke bankruptcy may be useful but not worth the
effort. For example, designing bespoke relief may not be worthwhile if
the entities in question are not vulnerable to significant financial distress,
or if nonbankruptcy mechanisms, such as receiverships, prove to be
adequate in addressing financial distress.
For all of these reasons, the use of bespoke bankruptcy should be
limited. However, there are still times when bespoke bankruptcy is the
only option that will provide relief for a debtor that desperately needs it.
The next Section addresses how to determine eligibility for bespoke
bankruptcy, as well as when a bespoke solution should be preferred over
Code-based relief.
B. Further Use of Bespoke Bankruptcy
Bespoke bankruptcy may have significant potential to assist some
bankruptcy misfits; however, the concerns articulated above caution
against its widespread adoption. To date, Congress has developed
bespoke bankruptcy only in response to crises: Dodd-Frank came about
248. See The Status of PROMESA, supra note 247, at 85 (“[T]he University depends on Title
IV funds for its survival and yet the Fiscal Plan violates the eligibility requirements of Title IV.”).
249. A related issue arises with respect to eligibility for Paycheck Protection Program (PPP)
loans, which the Small Business Administration (SBA) is administering to help businesses address
the economic fallout from COVID-19. See Alex Wolf, Virus Aid Continues to Elude Bankrupt
Companies as Deadline Hits, BLOOMBERG L. (June 30, 2020, 5:16 AM), https://news.bloomberg
law.com/bankruptcy-law/virus-aid-continues-to-elude-bankrupt-companies-as-deadline-hits
[https://perma.cc/J3AA-JA6Q]. Companies in bankruptcy are prohibited from applying for the
loans under the SBA’s rules, and some must “navigat[e] the waters between the PPP and
reorganizing their businesses to survive.” Id. Although hypothetical, it is worth questioning
whether, if a bespoke regime were available, companies would take advantage of a bespoke
process that does not call itself “bankruptcy” in order to maintain eligibility for PPP loans, as well
as whether such a strategy would or should succeed.
250. See Barron, supra note 229 (discussing the oversight board’s decision to reduce public
pensions as “a denial of basic democratic principles”).
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because of the Great Recession, while Puerto Rico’s looming defaults
spurred Congress to enact PROMESA. Hastily enacted legislation may
work well as a stopgap measure, but legislation that has been passed after
consideration and debate may prove more robust in the long term.251
Thus, it is worth considering whether and how Congress might identify
entities that are good candidates for bespoke bankruptcy, as well as how
Congress could assess if bespoke bankruptcy’s benefits outweigh its costs
for these candidates. This Section proposes a mechanism to achieve these
results, consisting of an initial eligibility test followed by a four-factor
assessment of any entities that pass the eligibility test. Each component
of this mechanism is described more fully below.
1. The Eligibility Test
To determine whether an entity is minimally eligible for bespoke
bankruptcy, this Article proposes a viability test. Specifically,
policymakers should seek to identify entities that have no choice but to
survive due to the public importance of the goods or services they
provide. Put differently, this test asks whether an entity must remain
viable to avert significant, systemic public harm—whether the entity, by
virtue of what it provides, is “too important to fail.”252 Use of the viability
test means that bespoke bankruptcy does not replace the Bankruptcy
Code for the majority of debtors that currently use it.
251. See Wyss & Kaske, supra note 1 (“The implementation of Promesa without a
comprehensive development plan has proved to be difficult, if not unsuccessful.”). The numerous
challenges PROMESA has faced since its enactment illustrate how speedy legislation can become
an easy target for its critics. See, e.g., Michelle Kaske, Ambac Seeks to Dismiss Puerto Rico’s
Record Bankruptcy, BLOOMBERG L. (May 26, 2020, 9:20 PM), https://news.bloomberg
law.com/bankruptcy-law/ambac-seeks-to-dismiss-puerto-ricos-record-bankruptcy [https://perma
.cc/QSR6-CX2B] (discussing allegations that PROMESA is unconstitutional); see Fin. Oversight
& Mgmt. Bd. for P.R. v. Aurelius Inv., LLC, 140 S. Ct. 1649, 1671–83 (2020) (Sotomayor, J.,
concurring) (questioning whether Congress had the power to create the PROMESA oversight
board).
252. Shlomit Azgad-Tromer, Too Important to Fail: Bankruptcy Versus Bailout of Socially
Important Non-Financial Institutions, 7 HARV. BUS. L. REV. 159, 164 (2017). For a discussion of
“socially important non-financial institutions” that might pass this test because they are “too
important to fail,” see id. at 161–62, 173, 175. In addition to these entities, others may pass the
viability test if they, as a group, will overwhelm the economy in the absence of a bailout. These
entities may include companies that are critically important to the economy, such as the auto
industry, or even insurance companies. See, e.g., TOO BIG TO FAIL: POLICIES AND PRACTICES IN
GOVERNMENT BAILOUTS 222 (Benton E. Gup ed., 2004) (quoting an auto industry analyst
describing Chrysler as “too big, too important, [having] too many employees, and [paying] taxes
in too many states for the government not to consider seriously the possibility of the company
going out of business”). A full exploration of these entities is outside this Article’s scope;
however, if these entities pass the viability test as a group, the current, ad hoc bailout processes
that have been used for their rescue in the past should be weighed against the benefits of a bespoke
bankruptcy regime.
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A viability test makes sense as an eligibility floor in part because the
Bankruptcy Code often implicitly assumes that debtors will have the
choice to either liquidate assets or reorganize.253 The Bankruptcy Code’s
own structure reinforces the idea of choice for the vast majority of debtors
it accommodates.254 For example, a business debtor may proceed under
Chapter 11 or under Chapter 7.255 Individuals may choose to either
liquidate their debts under Chapter 7 or keep their assets and propose a
repayment plan under Chapter 13.256 Debtors that must remain viable,
however, lack a meaningful choice among options: they must continue in
their role as providers of important public goods and services despite their
financial distress.
The viability test also makes sense given the high potential costs of
bespoke bankruptcy. If an entity is important enough that it must survive
despite financial difficulties, it is arguably worth going through the
trouble of creating a bespoke process to save it, if one is needed. 257 Put
differently, a viability test for bespoke bankruptcy makes sense because
the entities that can pass this test have a need for survival that justifies the
increased uncertainty and cost associated with the process of creating
bespoke legislation.
Some scholars have already begun to recognize that Code-based
bankruptcy does not work well for these “too-important-to-fail”
entities.258 Many of them are, in essence, too big for bankruptcy—their
problems go beyond those that the procedures in the Bakruptcy Code are
designed to address. As a result, the federal government must often get
involved when these entities face financial distress.259 To this extent, the
viability test can mitigate concerns about federal government overreach,
as the federal government may have to be involved in the resolution of
these entities’ financial distress, regardless of the mechanism they use. In
253. See supra Section I.B.
254. See 11 U.S.C. § 109.
255. See id.
256. See id.
257. The question of whether a bespoke process is actually needed is dealt with through the
four-factor assessment, discussed in Section III.B.2.
258. Azgad-Tromer, supra note 252, at 162–63 (arguing that the bankruptcy process
suboptimally values new investment opportunities for many of these entities).
259. See id. at 173. For example, the Dodd-Frank Act recognizes that certain financial
institutions that are “too big to fail” should be subject to more regulation and oversight by, for
example, the submission of “living will[s]” to a federal regulator. See Living Wills (or Resolution
Plans), supra note 142; see also Brian Chappatta, OPINION: MTA Can’t Go Bankrupt. So How
Does It Survive?, BLOOMBERG L. (June 29, 2020, 6:00 AM), https://news.bloomberglaw.com/
bankruptcy-law/opinion-mta-cant-go-bankrupt-so-how-does-it-survive [https://perma.cc/E37A86GQ] (discussing how Congress has provided money to the Metropolitan Transit Authority in
New York to cover decreases in ridership during the COVID-19 pandemic and noting that “[t]o
some extent, ‘every mass transit system needs to be subsidized’” in part because they are “too big
to fail”).
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other words, the viability test can be used to identify entities that require
federal government involvement because of their importance to society
at large.
Puerto Rico and its territorial instrumentalities are obvious examples
of the type of entities that would pass the viability test. The government
of Puerto Rico provides innumerable essential services to the Puerto
Rican people, including education, social services, and utilities.260
Although some government assets may be liquidated,261 an entire
liquidation of the territory’s assets would be unthinkable. And, as
previously discussed, Code-based bankruptcy was not an option for
Puerto Rico and its territorial instrumentalities and would not have been
an option without substantial modifications.262 As a result, the federal
government had to get involved to assist the island with resolving its
fiscal distress.
2. The Four-Factor Assessment
Although the viability test substantially limits access to bespoke
bankruptcy, the question remains whether bespoke bankruptcy is worth
the effort, even for eligible entities. Thus, once an entity has passed the
initial viability test, policymakers should further assess the entity’s need
for bespoke bankruptcy using the four factors articulated below.
Numerosity. The numerosity factor assesses how many of these
entities exist. A critical question that must be addressed with respect to
bespoke bankruptcy is how tailored the bespoke law can be without
running afoul of the Constitution’s requirement that Congress create
uniform bankruptcy laws.263 Notably, at least one scholar has expressed
concern that PROMESA violates this uniformity requirement because
Title III of the Act effectively applies only to Puerto Rico, and not to
other U.S. territories.264 Thus, the number of entities a proposed bespoke
bankruptcy law would cover is important, not just because it may not be
worth the effort to create bespoke relief for only one entity, but also
260. See Puerto Rico, USA.GOV, usa.gov/state-government/Puerto-rico [https://perma.cc/
H5CG-7REQ] (listing the territory’s major agencies); About the Puerto Rico Energy Bureau, P.R.
ENERGY BUREAU, https://energia.pr.gov/en/about-the-commission/ [https://perma.cc/FP8D-YENH].
261. See Nick Brown, Puerto Rico Board Approves Liquidation of Government Development
Bank, REUTERS (July 14, 2017, 9:34 PM), https://www.reuters.com/article/us-puertorico-debtgdb-restructuring/puerto-rico-board-approves-liquidation-of-government-development-bank-id
USKBN1A0012 [https://perma.cc/J5QH-SCG8] (discussing the oversight board’s decision to
wind down Puerto Rico’s Government Development Bank).
262. See supra Section II.A.2.b.
263. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 4 (“The Congress shall have Power . . . To
establish . . . uniform Laws on the subject of Bankruptcies throughout the United States . . . .”).
264. See Stephen J. Lubben, PROMESA and the Bankruptcy Clause: A Reminder About
Uniformity, 12 BROOK. J. CORP. FIN. & COM. L. 53, 54 (2017).
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because of the need to avoid the creation of “private” bankruptcy laws.265
Practically speaking, “bespoke bankruptcy” means development of
bespoke relief for a category of entities as a group rather than
development of a bespoke framework for individual entities.
Consideration of the numerosity requirement is also important because
the cost of developing and implementing bespoke bankruptcy would
skyrocket if a bespoke framework were tailored to each individual debtor
in a group.
Similarity. The similarity factor asks how similar entities are to each
other. Development of a bespoke bankruptcy framework for individual
entities should be discouraged for reasons related to the Constitution’s
uniformity requirement described above, as well as for efficiency
concerns. Instead, policymakers should assess whether an entity—for
example, the territory of Puerto Rico—may be placed in a broader
category of entities (e.g., all U.S. territories). To the extent that territories
can be expected to face similar financial problems, it may make sense to
adopt one bespoke framework for all territories as a group rather than
bespoke bankruptcy for each individual territory.
Mismatch. This factor examines how well Code-based bankruptcy
does or should work for the entities in question. In evaluating this factor,
policymakers should take a hard look at the obstacles (or lack thereof) to
simply amending the Bankruptcy Code to accommodate these debtors. If
the entities in question are not eligible for Code-based bankruptcy, or if
there is a significant conflict prohibiting the entities’ access to Codebased relief, this factor weighs in favor of bespoke bankruptcy. On the
other hand, if an entity’s access to or use of bankruptcy can be easily
accommodated through amending the Bankruptcy Code, this factor
weighs in favor of Code-based bankruptcy.266 Even if there is substantial
265. Id. at 58 (observing that the Supreme Court has “provided Congress with the ability to
enact laws dealing with geographically isolated problems, as long as the law operates uniformly
upon a given class of creditors and debtors”); see also Kurt H. Nadelmann, On the Origin of the
Bankruptcy Clause, 1 AM. J. LEGAL HIST. 215, 227 (1957) (“[I]t is no accident, we think, that the
Bankruptcy Clause speaks of ‘uniform laws,’ rather than one ‘uniform law,’ which Congress may
pass on the subject of bankruptcies, thus leaving Congress a free hand in adopting, if it so desired,
different laws for different types of debtors.”); Todd Zywicki, Bankruptcy Clause, HERITAGE
FOUND., https://www.heritage.org/constitution/articles/1/essays/41/bankruptcy-clause [https://
perma.cc/SP92-55RU] (“The ‘uniformity’ requirement does, how-ever, forbid ‘private’
bankruptcy laws that affect only particular debtors.”).
266. Part II extensively describes instances where Congress has amended the Bankruptcy
Code to provide easier access to or use of bankruptcy procedures. Other examples of access to
bankruptcy that a Bankruptcy Code amendment would accommodate include the Family Farmer
Relief Act of 2019, Pub. L. No. 116-51, 133 Stat. 1075, which expanded the debt limit for Chapter
12 bankruptcy eligibility, and the Honoring American Veterans in Extreme Need Act of 2019
(HAVEN Act), Pub. L. No. 116-52, 133 Stat. 1076, which excluded Veterans Affairs and Defense
Department disability payments from the means test that determines bankruptcy eligibility for
individual debtors.
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mismatch between use of the Bankruptcy Code and the entities’ needs,
policymakers should still evaluate the existing alternatives to bankruptcy,
if any, for the entities in question.
Tribal gaming corporations that are subject to the Indian Gaming
Regulatory Act (IGRA)267 provide a good example of mismatch.
Although these entities are technically eligible for bankruptcy, there are
significant conflicts between Chapter 11’s absolute priority rule and the
Code requirement that the estate preserve assets for the benefit of
creditors, on the one hand, and the IGRA’s requirement that a tribe hold
the sole proprietary interest in a gaming operation, on the other.268 These
conflicts, along with other concerns about how tribal sovereignty might
be reconciled with a federal bankruptcy regime, suggest a high degree of
mismatch between a distressed tribal gaming operation’s needs and the
Bankruptcy Code’s responsiveness to those needs.
Vulnerability. Finally, the vulnerability factor seeks to ascertain the
risks to the financial stability of the entities in question. Another way of
looking at this test is to assess an entity’s need for the basic elements of
bankruptcy relief. Do these entities need a compulsory, collective debt
adjustment process due to the presence of competing creditor claims? Do
they need breathing space in the form of an automatic stay or other
moratorium to ensure their survival? Are there any concerns about
financial mismanagement or systemic vulnerabilities in the way these
entities are operated? Puerto Rico, for example, had multiple competing
claims and a desperate need for breathing space to relieve it from its
payment obligations. Further, the island was particularly vulnerable to
economic shocks after years of fiscal mismanagement.
3. Some Thoughts on Process
The mechanism just described to determine the need for and
usefulness of bespoke bankruptcy—a viability test combined with a fourfactor assessment—is information-intensive and requires rigorous
analysis. Thus, it is important to consider who would use this mechanism
in practice. This Article has referred to “Congress” and “policymakers”
more generally as those who would undertake the decision of whether
and when to pass bespoke bankruptcy; ultimately, Congress would have
the final say in the matter.269 However, much of the heavy lifting would
likely be done through the use of other experts, such as legal scholars,
267. Pub. L. No. 100-497, 102 Stat. 2467 (1988) (codified at 18 U.S.C. §§ 1166–68 and 25
U.S.C. §§ 2701–21).
268. See Coordes, supra note 85, at 382 (discussing extensive concerns about tribal
sovereignty, the Indian Gaming Regulatory Act, and conflicts with the Bankruptcy Code’s priority
rules).
269. Per the Constitution, Congress has the power to enact “uniform Laws on the subject of
Bankruptcies throughout the United States.” U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 4.
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think tanks, and industry groups. This raises the additional concern that
the process surrounding the creation of bespoke bankruptcy may be
subject to lobbying, partisan debate, and other forms of undue influence.
Unfortunately, this is a concern with the legislative process more
generally, and it is a concern to which the Bankruptcy Code itself is not
immune.270 Although the extent to which special interests have
dominated the legislative process is debatable,271 this concern does
highlight the need for information sharing and nonpartisan research to
play a role in the development of bespoke bankruptcy.
C. The Proposal in Action
This Section provides a high-level, illustrative example of how this
Article’s proposed mechanism would work. It concludes that
subsovereign entities, particularly U.S. states and some municipalities,
would likely benefit from bespoke bankruptcy. Although subsovereigns
are certainly not the only entities that may require bespoke bankruptcy,
an examination of subsovereign debtors makes particular sense in light
of PROMESA’s relatively recent passage and questions that have arisen
among government leaders about the possibility of state bankruptcy.272
The remainder of this Section illustrates how policymakers might
approach the factors and questions this Article’s proposal articulates.
Although this Article makes a case for subsovereigns to receive bespoke
bankruptcy, a full and detailed inquiry—beyond what this Article
highlights—into the considerations the proposal outlines would need to
be undertaken before proceeding with the development of bespoke relief.
Subsovereigns clearly pass the viability test, making them minimally
eligible for bespoke bankruptcy relief. These entities are the backbone of
public life: they provide necessary services to the citizens that live within
their borders. As Professor Clay Gillette wrote with respect to generalpurpose municipalities:
[L]ocal government provision addresses a market failure that
would otherwise leave a void in service provision,
270. See A. Mechele Dickerson, Regulating Bankruptcy: Public Choice, Ideology, &
Beyond, 84 WASH. U. L. REV. 1861, 1903 (2006) (addressing the common concern that the 2005
amendments to the Bankruptcy Code were the product of industry capture and arguing instead
that the legislative process balanced multiple, competing interests).
271. See id. at 1876.
272. See, e.g., Carl Hulse, McConnell Says States Should Consider Bankruptcy, Rebuffing
Calls for Aid, N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 22, 2020), https://www.nytimes.com/2020/04/22/us/coronavirusmcconnell-states-bankruptcy.html [https://perma.cc/G4VA-H7RQ]. In addition, other territories,
such as the U.S. Virgin Islands, may also require bespoke bankruptcy relief. See Amanda Albright,
There’s a New Muni-Debt Crisis Brewing in Another U.S. Territory, BLOOMBERG QUINT (Oct. 1,
2019, 10:58 PM), https://www.bloombergquint.com/business/there-s-a-new-muni-debt-crisisbrewing-in-another-u-s-territory [https://perma.cc/8J3Y-QV94].
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notwithstanding significant demand. Local government
intervention becomes all the more important given that many
of the services that have the characteristics of public goods
are crucial to a high quality of life. These include security
(police and fire), transportation (street maintenance), and
health (sewer and water). . . . [I]f localities fail to provide
these services in an adequate manner, residents with
insufficient mobility will be unable to obtain them from any
alternative source, given their undersupply in the private
market. Local government incapacity to provide these
services, therefore, constitutes an abrogation of the very
functions
for
which
the
locality
was
created. . . . [M]unicipalities are created in large part to
provide public goods and services not available in the market
. . . .273
State governments similarly provide crucial services, including
“police protection, education, highway building and maintenance,
welfare programs, and hospital and health care.”274 Liquidation of state
and municipal assets would create significant public harm. These
subsovereigns are clearly “too important to fail.”275
Moving on to the four-factor test, both states and municipalities are
numerous. A proposed bespoke bankruptcy law for states would cover all
fifty states, and a proposed bespoke bankruptcy law for municipalities
could cover nearly 90,000 municipal governments.276 Adopting bespoke
bankruptcy for either states or municipalities would not cause concern
about “private” bankruptcy laws.
Assessing the similarity factor requires a bit more nuance. Every state
and municipality is managed differently. Yet, the basic structure of the
services states provide and the ways in which they fund them (e.g.,
273. Clayton P. Gillette, How Cities Fail: Service Delivery Insolvency and Municipal
Bankruptcy, 2019 MICH. ST. L. REV. 1211, 1221–22 (2019).
274. Financing State and Local Government, USHISTORY.ORG, https://www.ushistory.org/
gov/12b.asp [https://perma.cc/B8AL-KGC2].
275. Further evidence of the “too important to fail status” of states and municipalities comes
from the Federal Reserve’s municipal lending facility, which was created during the COVID-19
pandemic to allow states, counties, and cities to borrow from the federal government. See An
Illinois Default Is Unlikely, Citigroup Says, CRAIN’S CHI. BUS. (June 8, 2020, 1:28 PM),
https://www.chicagobusiness.com/government/illinois-default-unlikely-citigroup-says (describing
how Illinois has used the municipal lending facility).
276. The most recent data available indicate a total of 89,476 municipal governments, made
up of 39,044 general-purpose local governments and 50,432 special-purpose local governments.
For a detailed breakdown, see Number of Municipal Governments & Population Distribution,
NAT’L LEAGUE CITIES, https://www.nlc.org/number-of-municipal-governments-populationdistribution#:~:text=MyNLC-Number%20of%20Municipal%20Governments%20%26%20
Population%20Distribution,governments%20and%203.033%20county%20governments [https://
perma.cc/5MUW-TNMQ].
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through taxation) seem to indicate that states could be grouped together
for purposes of bespoke bankruptcy.277 Indeed, this is exactly what some
proposals for Code-based state bankruptcy contemplate: one chapter of
the Bankruptcy Code that would be devoted to the needs of all states.278
Municipalities are slightly more complicated. Generally speaking,
municipalities can be broken down into “general-purpose,” such as cities,
towns, and counties, and “special-purpose,” such as school districts,
sewage districts, and water districts.279 Special-purpose municipalities
are functionally and structurally distinct from general-purpose
municipalities.280 This has led some scholars to suggest that separate
bankruptcy procedures be used for special-purpose municipalities and
general-purpose municipalities.281 An analysis of the similarity factor
suggests that a proposal could be made for bespoke legislation to
separately address states, general-purpose municipalities, and specialpurpose municipalities.
The mismatch factor also does not break down evenly between states
and municipalities. Substantial adjustment to the Code would be
necessary before it could accommodate U.S. states as debtors.282
Although states are ineligible for Code-based bankruptcy, municipalities
have an entire chapter of the Bankruptcy Code devoted to them.
However, Chapter 9 bankruptcy often fails municipalities in critically
important ways. Arguably, most general-purpose municipalities have
succeeded in spite of Chapter 9, rather than through strict adherence to its
framework.283 The Detroit bankruptcy, which was hailed as a success,284
ended as quickly and consensually as it did only because negotiators
277. See Financing State and Local Government, supra note 274 (discussing trends in state
and local revenues and expenses).
278. See, e.g., Role of Public Employee Pensions in Contributing to State Insolvency and the
Possibility of a State Bankruptcy Chapter: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Cts., Com. & Admin.
L. of the H. Comm. on the Judiciary, 112th Cong. 32 (2011).
279. Number of Municipal Governments & Population Distribution, supra note 276.
280. See Coordes, supra note 62, at 348–49.
281. See, e.g., id.; Buccola, supra note 73, at 854 n.136 (noting that special-purpose
municipalities “present different considerations” than general-purpose entities because they
“frequently resemble the commercial firms that file under Chapter 11 more than they do general
purpose municipalities” and concluding that “Chapter 9 may work reasonably well for most
special purpose debtors”).
282. Mooney, supra note 182, at 702.
283. For a detailed discussion of how Chapter 9 often fails municipalities, see generally
Coordes, supra note 62.
284. See, e.g., Pete Saunders, Detroit, Five Years After Bankruptcy, FORBES (July 19, 2018,
1:36 PM), https://www.forbes.com/sites/petesaunders1/2018/07/19/detroit-five-years-afterbankruptcy/#e5a2d87cfebb [https://perma.cc/82P4-ZFSM] (“Five years on, however, it’s
incredible how far Detroit has come.”); Corey Williams, 5 Years After Declaring Bankruptcy,
Detroit Reborn at a Cost, CHI. TRIB. (July 16, 2018, 1:09 PM), https://www.chicagotribune.com/
business/ct-biz-detroit-reborn-20180716-story.html [https://perma.cc/4H4P-X23L] (“The
turnaround since [the bankruptcy] has been remarkable . . . .”).
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working outside of the Chapter 9 process struck the Grand Bargain, a deal
that arguably altered the priority rules typically seen in bankruptcy.285 In
contrast, Vallejo, California, which completed a more traditional Chapter
9 bankruptcy, has been beset by the same financial difficulties that caused
it to enter bankruptcy in the first place.286
Chapter 9’s mismatch with the needs of general-purpose
municipalities, in particular, is evident from both legal scholarship and
practice. Most scholars that study Chapter 9 in depth have proposed
substantial changes to the process,287 observing that “[t]he current tools
available to municipal . . . governments are insufficient to address the
size, scale, and complexity of the fiscal situation” they are facing.288
Questions of priority, and particularly a municipality’s ability to prioritize
pensioners over bondholders in light of state constitutional law and other
constraints, suggest that Code-imposed priorities are at best undefined
and at worst at odds with the practical realities of municipal debt
restructuring.289 Other scholars have pointed out that municipal distress
can affect multiple jurisdictions at once; however, Chapter 9 only
addresses one municipality at a time.290

285. See Coordes, supra note 69, at 1265–66 (describing the extraordinary role of mediators
in the Detroit bankruptcy); Nathan Bomey et al., Judge OKs Bankruptcy Plan; a ‘Miraculous’
Outcome, DET. FREE PRESS (Nov. 7, 2014, 9:34 PM), https://www.freep.com/story/news/
local/detroit-bankruptcy/2014/11/07/rhodes-bankruptcy-decision/18648093/ [https://perma.cc/
UXA6-L2MT] (“Several major financial creditors . . . argued repeatedly during the case that the
grand bargain was illegal because it favored pensioners over other creditors.”).
286. See Coordes, supra note 62, at 308, 324 (discussing Vallejo and other examples of how
Chapter 9 “undermines the very objectives it is designed to help municipalities accomplish”).
287. See Coordes, supra note 62, at 342 (arguing that Chapter 9, as currently used,
contravenes many bankruptcy principles); Coordes & Reilly, supra note 156, at 496, 498
(describing the numerous and varied factors contributing to municipal fiscal distress and the
inadequacy of Chapter 9 alone to resolve that distress); Omer Kimhi, Reviving Cities: Legal
Remedies to Municipal Financial Crises, 88 B.U. L. REV. 633, 654 (2008) (discussing Chapter 9
in conjunction with oversight mechanisms); Juliet M. Moringiello, Goals and Governance in
Municipal Bankruptcy, 71 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 403, 415–16 (2014) (arguing for a combination
of state and federal tools to aid distressed municipalities); Aurelia Chaudhury et al., Junk Cities:
Resolving Insolvency Crises in Overlapping Municipalities, 107 CALIF. L. REV. 459, 466 (2019)
(advocating for coordination among distressed municipalities).
288. Mooney, supra note 182, at 697.
289. For a fuller discussion of state and municipal pension issues, see generally James E.
Spiotto, What Illinois Can Learn from the Supreme Court of Rhode Island and Even Puerto Rico
About Public Pension Reform, MUNINET GUIDE (Aug. 1, 2019), https://muninetguide.com/whatillinois-can-learn-from-the-supreme-court-of-rhode-island-and-even-puerto-rico-about-publicpension-reform/ [https://perma.cc/NF52-LVZX]. The City of Detroit arguably altered the
Bankruptcy Code’s priority scheme when it did not treat pensioners and bondholders equally. See
Coordes, supra note 62, at 321 n.102 (observing that the city chose to pay its retirees more than
its financial creditors, over objections from bond insurers).
290. See, e.g., Chaudhury et al., supra note 287, at 482.
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To be successful, municipal bankruptcy in practice looks very
different from the process Congress envisioned through Chapter 9.291 In
practice, Chapter 9 seems to work best when combined with other tools,
such as an emergency manager, increased state (or other external)
funding, or a team of experienced mediators.292 This suggests that debt
relief for general-purpose municipalities, such as cities, towns, and
counties, requires more than what Code-based bankruptcy can provide.
Notably, a different analysis may apply to special-purpose
municipalities. These municipalities and their capital structures often
look more like businesses than their general-purpose counterparts.293
Because of this, Chapter 9 may not pose as much of a mismatch for
special-purpose municipalities.294
Alternatives to bankruptcy for these subsovereigns often pose their
own problems. Although the federal or state government may provide
additional funding for state or local governments in distress,295 bailouts
raise concerns about moral hazard.296 It is technically possible for
general-purpose local governments to dissolve or merge with other
localities; however, dissolutions or consolidations occur only rarely and
are often subject to stringent conditions.297 It is perhaps more likely that
some special-purpose municipalities, such as school districts or hospitals,
could be dissolved, with a new legal entity created to replace them;
291. See Melissa B. Jacoby, Federalism Form and Function in the Detroit Bankruptcy, 33
YALE J. ON REG. 55, 57 (2016) (noting that Detroit’s success in Chapter 9 might be credited to the
bankruptcy court and that this “defies the conventional wisdom about municipal bankruptcies in
the legal world”).
292. See id. at 59 (noting the strategy used in Detroit, which was “structured . . . around levers
of control: active case management, deal-making and settlement promotion, team building, and a
‘court of the people’” (footnotes omitted)).
293. See Buccola, supra note 73, at 858, 861.
294. See id. at 858 (noting that the “primary target” of early municipal bankruptcy legislation
was the debt of special-purpose municipalities).
295. For example, the Federal Reserve has established a municipal liquidity facility, which
will purchase short-term notes from state and local governments in order to help them manage
their cash flow during the economic fallout from the COVID-19 pandemic. See Municipal
Liquidity Facility, BD. GOVERNORS FED. RSRV. SYS., https://www.federalreserve.gov/monetary
policy/muni.htm [https://perma.cc/CL5C-6X2X]. Ultimately, however, the Federal Reserve is
expecting to be repaid for these purchases, so the facility can hardly be deemed a bailout. See BD.
OF GOVERNORS OF THE FED. RSRV. SYS., REPORT TO CONGRESS PURSUANT TO SECTION 13(3) OF
THE FEDERAL RESERVE ACT: MUNICIPAL LIQUIDITY FACILITY 1 (2020), https://www.federal
reserve.gov/publications/files/municipal-liquidity-facility-4-16-20.pdf [https://perma.cc/CDB6X35K].
296. See David A. Skeel, Jr., Is Bankruptcy the Answer for Troubled Cities and States?, 50
HOUS. L. REV. 1063, 1080 (2013) (observing that there is a strong case for adopting formal
restructuring when bailout is the alternative).
297. See Michelle Wilde Anderson, Dissolving Cities, 121 YALE L.J. 1364, 1386 (2012)
(discussing dissolutions); Laura N. Coordes, When Borders Dissolve, 93 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 649,
653 (2018) (discussing consolidations).
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however, this process may jeopardize creditors’ access to tax revenues
generated by the entity. Finally, Congress has sought to limit the ability
of states to adjust the debts of their municipalities on their own through
measures such as compositions.298
The extent to which states and municipalities are truly vulnerable to
financial shocks is a hotly debated issue. Some commentators point out
that states, and to some degree municipalities, can address revenue
shortfalls through their power to tax.299 At the same time, there are
practical limitations on a state or local government’s taxing power.
Notably, tax increases can spur residents to leave if they are unwilling to
pay the increases.300 Exogenous shocks, for example a global pandemic
or recession, may make it difficult or impossible for residents to pay their
taxes.301 And although the federal government has occasionally been
willing to assist financially troubled state and local governments, such
relief is limited and difficult to come by.302 Furthermore, states cannot
print their own currency or refuse to pay their debts if the federal
government requires them to do so.303 As others have recognized, many
states are facing looming pension crises, and some mechanism to deal
with these crises will be necessary in the future.304 Thus, there is a very
real possibility that states may find themselves in a position similar to
that of Puerto Rico: facing multiple creditors, layers of debt, and an
298. SAM HOBBS, AMENDING THE MUNICIPAL BANKRUPTCY ACT, H.R. REP. NO. 79-2246, at
4 (1946) (reporting on H.R. 6682’s overruling of the Supreme Court’s decision in Faitoute Iron
& Steel Co. v. City of Asbury Park, which upheld a state law permitting municipal debt adjustment
only if 85% of the city’s creditors agreed, by expressly prohibiting state laws that provided for
debt adjustment without full creditor consent).
299. See, e.g., Josh Barro, Why Mitch McConnell’s State Bankruptcy Idea Is So Stupid,
INTELLIGENCER (Apr. 26, 2020), https://nymag.com/intelligencer/2020/04/why-mitch-mcconnells
-state-bankruptcy-idea-is-so-stupid.html [https://perma.cc/B6HE-CZ6D] (observing that “states
have the power to tax, and to increase taxes in times of budget shortfall”). But see Colin McGrath,
Comment, Municipal Bankruptcy and the Limits of Federalism, 18 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 1265, 1267
(2016) (“The proliferation of tax revolts across the United States during [the late 1970s and
1980s] . . . further depressed local governments’ access to operating funds.”).
300. See Gillette, supra note 273, at 1213.
301. Id. at 1215–16.
302. For example, the Federal Reserve’s municipal liquidity facility, launched due to the
COVID-19 pandemic, was designed to be used only as a last resort and is available only to states
and localities meeting a particular population threshold. See Bradley N. Ruwe & Marc T. Kamer,
The Federal Reserve’s Municipal Liquidity Facility: Providing Financial Relief But at What
Cost?, DINSMORE (May 20, 2020), https://www.dinsmore.com/publications/the-federal-reservesmunicipal-liquidity-facility-providing-financial-relief-but-at-what-cost/ [https://perma.cc/N2K73KY6] (describing the facility as a “last resort” and discussing eligibility for its use); see also
Coordes & Reilly, supra note 156, at 500 (discussing the flaws and limitations of state intervention
programs).
303. See Timothy Zick, Are the States Sovereign?, 83 WASH. U. L.Q. 229, 282 n.326 (2005)
(noting constitutional limitations on state authority).
304. See Mooney, supra note 182, at 677 (discussing data about pension crises in the states).
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inability to simply liquidate assets due to the important public services
they provide.305
After weighing the above factors, it seems reasonable to assume that
certain subsovereigns, such as states and general-purpose municipalities,
would be good candidates for bespoke bankruptcy. If that is the case,
what benefits could one expect bespoke bankruptcy to provide? The
primary overarching benefit of bespoke bankruptcy would be to resolve
the mismatch between these subsovereigns and Code-based relief. For
example, a bespoke system could provide for deviations from Code-based
priority or even an entirely different priority scheme than the Bankruptcy
Code articulates.306 As Congress did with PROMESA, a bespoke
framework could also provide for coordinated debt relief across
jurisdictions—for example, debt relief for multiple municipalities or a
municipality and the state in which it is located, in one coordinated
process.307 Moreover, a bespoke framework would give Congress more
leeway to design more appropriate relief in general—for example, by
developing new plan confirmation standards for subsovereigns.
Commentators have long observed that the Code’s plan confirmation
standards, which are largely borrowed from Chapter 11’s standard
template, do not work well in Chapter 9.308 As an example of just how
difficult it is to apply these standards in practice, the judge overseeing the
Detroit bankruptcy looked to his conscience and sense of morality to
resolve difficult questions regarding the confirmation of Detroit’s debt
adjustment plan.309 Bespoke bankruptcy could provide for alternative
plan confirmation standards that are more specific to and appropriate for

305. See id. at 688 (“[D]ealing with restructuring social benefits is more complicated
politically and constitutionally.”); Alexandre Tanzi, Nine States Face Economic Contraction,
Most Since 2009 Crisis, BLOOMBERG BUSINESSWEEK (Jan. 2, 2020, 4:43 PM), https://www.bloom
berg.com/news/articles/2020-01-02/nine-states-face-economic-contraction-most-since-2009crisis [https://perma.cc/R6UA-HX9F] (observing that the economies of nine states are expected
to contract within six months and that this is the greatest number of states in this position since
July of 2009).
306. See Mooney, supra note 182, at 737 (noting that priorities in state or municipal
bankruptcy might need to be different).
307. See Chaudhury et al., supra note 287, at 507 (“Puerto Rico’s current debt restructuring
process offers a real-world test of what a system built around the concept of tax-base insolvency
might look like in the context of overlapping jurisdictions.”).
308. See, e.g., Michael J. Deitch, Note, Time for an Update: A New Framework for
Evaluating Chapter 9 Bankruptcies, 83 FORDHAM L. REV. 2705, 2726–27 (2015) (discussing
inconsistencies in Chapter 9 plan confirmation orders); Juliet M. Moringiello, Chapter 9 Plan
Confirmation Standards and the Role of State Choices, 37 CAMPBELL L. REV. 71, 75 (2015)
(discussing the lack of clarity in Chapter 9 plan confirmation standards).
309. Coordes, supra note 62, at 342 n.241.
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subsovereign debtors.310 If Congress used bespoke bankruptcy in lieu of
Chapter 9 for general-purpose municipalities, it could work to provide
those entities with a menu of options that is both more expansive than and
substantially different from the Bankruptcy Code’s standard templates.
Bespoke bankruptcy may also be a better avenue than Code-based
bankruptcy for those who would like to extend bankruptcy protection to
states. Indeed, others have already suggested that, even though Puerto
Rico differs from a state government in important ways,311 PROMESA
could serve as a template for state bankruptcy, should the need or desire
arise to provide bankruptcy for states.312
Importantly, this Article does not advocate for expanding bankruptcy
access to U.S. states. A full discussion of the merits and drawbacks of
doing so is beyond this Article’s scope and has been taken up by others.313
Rather, this Article simply contends that if a debt relief mechanism is
ultimately adopted for the states, such a mechanism should be bespoke
rather than Code-based.314
Regardless of whether it is applied to municipalities, states, or both,
bespoke bankruptcy could provide for coordination of bankruptcy and
nonbankruptcy tools. For example, in the municipal context, bespoke
bankruptcy could offer a combination of a judicial debt adjustment
process with use of an oversight board or financial manager, as well as
an explicit role for the state. Scholars have already advocated for these
options as part of municipal bankruptcy reform.315 For states and
territories, bespoke bankruptcy could offer a combination of traditional
bankruptcy relief and sovereign debt restructuring tools, similar to the
way that PROMESA incorporates both options. Finally, bespoke
bankruptcy may even have rhetorical benefits. As recent discussions
about state bankruptcy have shown, “bankruptcy” is a politically charged
310. There is already a developing literature about specific changes to Chapter 9 plan
confirmation standards that may be desirable to implement. See, e.g., Michael W. McConnell &
Randal C. Picker, When Cities Go Broke: A Conceptual Introduction to Municipal Bankruptcy,
60 U. CHI. L. REV. 425, 466 (1993) (exploring the use of the confirmation standards as a means
for influencing governance); C. Scott Pryor, Who Pays the Price? The Necessity of Taxpayer
Participation in Chapter 9, 24 WIDENER L.J. 81, 85 (2015) (discussing the possibility of using the
feasibility standard to account for taxpayer interests).
311. See Block, supra note 176, at 238–40 .
312. See, e.g., Mooney, supra note 182, at 713–18 (proposing a PROMESA-like process for
states). Professor Skeel has also proposed an alternative to state bankruptcy in the form of a federal
oversight strategy. See Skeel, supra note 214, at 729, 731.
313. See, e.g., Schwarcz, supra note 214, at 335–43 (discussing the merits of expanding
bankruptcy access to the states). See generally Skeel, supra note 214 (exploring the benefits of
state bankruptcy in addition to the reasons for resisting this framework).
314. See generally, e.g., Schwarcz, supra note 214 (proposing a solution enabling states to
work out their debt problems with creditors).
315. See Kimhi, supra note 102, at 385 (arguing for oversight boards); Moringiello, supra
note 308, at 75 (arguing for increased state involvement).
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word.316 Indeed, although it includes a bankruptcy process, PROMESA
contains no reference to “bankruptcy” at all. Because it exists outside of
the Bankruptcy Code, bespoke bankruptcy can be framed as something
other than bankruptcy and therefore may pass a political litmus test that
Code-based bankruptcy cannot.
The fact that subsovereigns such as state and local governments pass
the viability test mitigates, but likely does not completely resolve,
concerns about federal government overreach. As Puerto Rico’s
experience with PROMESA illustrates, concerns about federal
encroachment are always present when considering oversight
mechanisms linked to debt restructuring. To the extent possible, Congress
should work with state and local leaders if and when it develops bespoke
bankruptcy for these subsovereigns, and it should emphasize the extent
to which bespoke bankruptcy can represent a partnership among
governments rather than an imposition by Congress.
Relatedly, a core purpose of this Article’s proposal is to identify
candidates for bespoke bankruptcy ex ante—before distress hits.
Although it is arguably difficult to entice Congress—or any entity—to
plan for possible fiscal distress,317 identifying candidates and exploring
options for bespoke relief before distress hits has significant advantages.
Although it cannot be stated for certain, it is possible that many of the
problems Puerto Rico has experienced with PROMESA’s
implementation could have been mitigated or avoided entirely by careful
drafting or coordination with the territorial government. For example, the
litigation surrounding the constitutionality of the oversight board’s
appointment might have been resolved in advance by simply providing
for the Senate to confirm the President’s board choices. And the inclusion
of local leaders in the drafting of PROMESA may have mitigated some
of the negative perceptions associated with PROMESA on the island.
Another reason to develop bespoke bankruptcy ex ante relates to
creditor expectations. Experience with both PROMESA and municipal
bankruptcies has shown that creditors will vehemently resist post-distress
alterations in priority.318 Indeed, as discussed, one of the key problems
with municipal bankruptcy is the lack of a defined priority scheme that
clearly applies in the municipal context. Creating a defined priority
316. See CEMBALEST, supra note 221 (“That’s why it was disappointing to see [state
bankruptcy] . . . framed in the press as a crude partisan divide after comments from Senator
McConnell and various reactions to them.”).
317. See Gillette & Skeel, supra note 71, at 1183 (“No mayor wants to be the one who has
put his or her city in bankruptcy.”).
318. See, e.g., Rochelle, First Circuit, supra note 235; Joseph Lichterman, Protecting Detroit
Pensions May Violate Bankruptcy Code: Judge, REUTERS (Oct. 21, 2013, 7:38 PM),
https://www.reuters.com/article/us-usa-detroit-bankruptcy/protecting-detroit-pensions-mayviolate-bankruptcy-code-judge-idUSBRE99K19W20131021 [https://perma.cc/6DHS-5ZEZ].
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scheme in advance allows parties to know where they stand relative to
others if and when bankruptcy occurs.
Finally, although this Article has used subsovereigns as an illustrative
example of the type of entity that may benefit from bespoke relief, this
does not represent the full scope of bespoke bankruptcy’s potential
applications. Other debtors—private as well as public—may qualify for
bespoke bankruptcy. For example, utilities may be another candidate for
consideration. As PG&E’s recent bankruptcy shows, utilities often
provide critical public services and play a significant public role, such
that financial distress that provokes concerns about viability often
necessitates government involvement.319 In PG&E’s bankruptcy, a
creditor group even argued that the company was overly focused on value
maximization to the detriment of the residents and businesses it serves as
customers.320 And observers have concluded that bankruptcy has not
worked well for PG&E, suggesting that it is “exiting bankruptcy facing
many of the same challenges as it did the day it filed.”321

319. For example, PG&E is incredibly important to the public of California, to the point
where the governor has threatened a state-led takeover of the utility if it does not quickly
reorganize in Chapter 11. See Mark Chediak, California Governor Threatens to Step in and
“Restructure” PG&E, BLOOMBERG (Nov. 2, 2019, 9:00 AM), https://www.bloomberg.com/news
/articles/2019-11-01/california-governor-threatens-to-step-in-and-restructure-pg-e [https://perma
.cc/N8RV-DCHQ]; Steven Church, PG&E May Pay $1 Billion in Financing Fees to Banks,
Backers, BLOOMBERG (Nov. 7, 2019, 2:18 PM), https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/201911-07/pg-e-fees-may-hit-1-billion-for-turnaround-bankers-and-backers [https://perma.cc/6JN8W8C2] (observing that the PG&E bankruptcy is unusual in part due to the impact on millions of
people and the state governor’s involvement). PG&E is a private entity, but it has a significant
public impact. Steven Church & Mark Chediak, PG&E Falls After Losing Legal Fight Over
California Fire Policy, BLOOMBERG GREEN (Nov. 29, 2019, 10:09 AM), https://www.bloomberg
.com/news/articles/2019-11-27/pg-e-loses-fight-over-wildfire-policy-that-led-to-its-bankruptcy
[https://perma.cc/R38E-C3P5] (noting that PG&E is treated similarly to a public entity in
California). Indeed, the Governor of California functionally had to approve PG&E’s bankruptcy
plan. See Mark Chediak, PG&E Plunges as It Races to Meet Governor’s Bankruptcy Demand,
S.F. CHRON. (Dec. 16, 2019), https://www.sfchronicle.com/business/article/PG-E-plunges-as-itraces-to-meet-governor-s-14909701.php [https://perma.cc/85T6-SHTC].
320. See Scott Deveau & Mark Chediak, Elliott Bashes PG&E Bankruptcy Plan as Failing
State Guidelines, BLOOMBERG L. (Dec. 12, 2019, 9:34 AM), https://news.bloomberglaw.com/
bankruptcy-law/pimco-elliott-group-presses-newsom-to-reject-pg-e-restructuring [https://perma
.cc/58XT-AXT8].
321. Mark Chediak, PG&E Is Set to Exit Bankruptcy, Ending Saga Sparked by Fires,
BLOOMBERG L. (June 17, 2020, 7:00 AM), https://news.bloomberglaw.com/environment-andenergy/pg-e-bankruptcy-judge-says-he-will-approve-companys-plan-1 [https://perma.cc/Q3GASCXY] (noting that PG&E “will emerge from Chapter 11 having nearly doubled its debt to more
than $38 billion”); see also Mark Chediak, PG&E Bankruptcy Judge to Confirm Restructuring
Plan, BLOOMBERG L. (June 17, 2020, 8:44 PM), https://news.bloomberglaw.com/environmentand-energy/pg-e-bankruptcy-judge-to-confirm-restructuring-plan [https://perma.cc/W5BV-F7JD]
(quoting the bankruptcy judge who confirmed PG&E’s plan as saying that rejecting the plan “‘is
not an acceptable alternative’ because there are no other options on the table”).
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In addition to utilities, there are many other possibilities to explore.
A review of the existing bankruptcy literature suggests that mass tort
cases,322 churches,323 nonprofits,324 and public universities325 are all
potential candidates for a bespoke regime. In short, other bankruptcy
misfits exist and should be considered as possible contenders for bespoke
relief. As scholars continue to uncover the difficulties that these and other
entities experience, the framework proposed above will help them reach
a determination about whether a bespoke regime is indeed necessary or
appropriate in any given instance.
CONCLUSION
The Bankruptcy Code provides debt relief for a vast number of
entities every day. But it does not, and cannot, accommodate every entity
that might seek to use it. This Article explored whether and when
Congress might consider adapting bankruptcy law to accommodate
certain bankruptcy misfits. In particular, it advocated for the expanded
use of a concept that has already been introduced into U.S. bankruptcy
law: bespoke bankruptcy. To date, bespoke bankruptcy has been used too
little and too late—it has been developed for only a handful of bankruptcy
misfits and only on an ex post, ad hoc basis. It is thus an undertheorized
and underutilized concept.
Over the years since the enactment of the Bankruptcy Code, the legal
community has come to recognize that traditional, Code-based
bankruptcy mechanisms do not serve all debtors well and that concepts
such as bankruptcy priority, feasibility, and value maximization do not
apply evenly across the board.326 At the same time, the lack of any
alternative framework in most cases has meant that many bankruptcy
misfits end up using Code-based bankruptcy simply because that is the
only option available. This Article encourages the robust exploration of
322. See, e.g., Yair Listokin & Kenneth Ayotte, Protecting Future Claimants in Mass Tort
Bankruptcies, 98 NW. U. L. REV. 1435, 1435 (2004) (“The problem of ‘future claimants’ plagues
the resolution of mass tort bankruptcies.”).
323. See, e.g., David A. Skeel Jr., “Sovereignty” Issues and the Church Bankruptcy Cases,
29 SETON HALL LEGIS. J. 345, 346 (2005) (“Of particular concern was the danger that the
bankruptcy laws, which provide for extensive oversight of the debtor’s finances, might interfere
with the religious affairs of the church, thus running afoul of the First Amendment guarantee of
free exercise of religion.”).
324. See, e.g., Pamela Foohey, Chapter 11 Reorganization and the Fair and Equitable
Standard: How the Absolute Priority Rule Applies to All Nonprofit Entities, 86 ST. JOHN’S L. REV.
31, 32–33 (2012) (discussing the challenges nonprofit institutions face in bankruptcy).
325. See, e.g., Bruckner, supra note 41, at 241 (observing that higher education institutions
“are effectively precluded from reorganizing in bankruptcy because of financial disincentives
created by Congress”).
326. See, e.g., Azgad-Tromer, supra note 252, at 162–63; Christopher K. Odinet, Of
Progressive Property and Public Debt, 51 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 1101, 1102 (2016).
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bespoke bankruptcy alternatives to Code-based bankruptcy relief and
offers a proposal to identify candidates for bespoke bankruptcy.
To be clear, proposing further consideration and development of
bespoke bankruptcy does not mean that bespoke bankruptcy is problemfree, or even less prone to problems than its Code-based cousin. As this
Article has repeatedly emphasized, there are many legal, political, and
practical considerations that must be accounted for in the development of
any bespoke framework. For this and other reasons, this Article has
proposed that bespoke bankruptcy be available only to a small subset of
debtors—those who can, at a minimum, pass this Article’s viability test.
Although this subset of debtors is small in number compared to those
eligible for Code-based bankruptcy, it includes entities that perform
critical roles in society, such that the increased costs and uncertainty of a
bespoke framework may be justified.
Much work needs to be done to implement bespoke bankruptcy as a
robust complement to Code-based relief. Future work should explore
processes that policymakers could use to coordinate actors and develop
bespoke relief, when appropriate. Relatedly, an in-depth discussion of the
extent to which Code-based practices should continue to dominate
bankruptcy law in the future is likely necessary. And more research into
bespoke bankruptcy’s possible effects on other parts of U.S. law is
certainly needed. Although substantial work lies ahead, this Article, by
defining bespoke bankruptcy and articulating the steps needed to assess
whether it is worth the effort, has set the stage for a new direction in
bankruptcy law.
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